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ABSTRACT
WHEN STUDENT-ON-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT TRIGGERS SCHOOL
DISTRICT LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IX
Joseph R. Salmieri III, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Rosita Lopez, Director
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in
education, including K-12 institutions and colleges/universities. The United States
Supreme Court has held that Title IX holds schools liable for sex discrimination, including
sexual harassment and sexual assault. In the landmark case Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education, the Supreme Court identified the criteria in which a school district can be
held liable for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX. The Supreme Court’s
criterion is presented in the form of a three-prong test, and all prongs must be satisfied for
liability to exist. The first prong is whether or not the harassment was so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that the victim was denied access to an educational opportunity.
The second prong is whether an official who had the authority to stop the harassment had
actual notice of the harassment. Finally, the third prong is whether an official who did have
both the authority to stop the harassment and actual notice remained deliberately
indifferent.
The goal of this study was to analyze post-Davis case law to determine how and
when a school can be found liable for student-on-student sexual harassment. This analysis
can help school administrators and school boards to develop policies and practices to help
prevent Title IX liability for student-on-student sexual harassment.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is a federal statute that prohibits
discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of sex in schools that receive federal funds.
All forms of harassment based on sex are prohibited.1 The forms of harassment based on
sex include sexual assault, sexual harassment, and harassment based on a student’s failure
to conform to gender stereotypes.2 Whether the perpetrator intends to harm the victim is
inconsequential. Sexual harassment under Title IX can still take place even if the
perpetrator and victim are of different sexes, and severe harassment does not automatically
require repeated incidents.
Title IX protects every person, not only women, from sex-based harassment in
school districts that receive federal funding. School districts violate Title IX when studenton-student sexual harassment is so severe that it effectively denies a student the ability to
participate in or benefit from the school or school activities and such harassment is
encouraged, tolerated, not adequately addressed, or ignored by school employees.3 If and
when a violation occurs, the victim of the alleged sexual harassment may bring suit against
the school district to seek a remedy and/or damages for enduring the alleged harassment.
Consequently, it is important for school administrators to understand their legal obligations
1
2
3

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title 20 U.S.C. Sections 1681-1688).
Id.
National Women’s Law Center, The Next Generation of Title IX: Harassment and Bullying Based on Sex,
2011 at 1.
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under Title IX, not only to protect potential victims but also to protect the school district
from being held liable in potential lawsuits.

Statement of the Problem

There are two distinct sides of this problem that should be concerning to school
administrators. One is the continued prevalence of student-on-student sexual harassment in
schools. The second is the evolution of enforcement, leading to increased litigation for
school districts regarding student-on-student sexual harassment, which can prove to be
costly.
Regarding the first side of the problem, despite the major efforts to stop student-onstudent sexual harassment in school, including sexual assault, these forms of sex
discrimination are still a significant problem in K-12 schools throughout the nation.
Students begin to experience student-on-student sexual harassment as early as elementary
school. In a 2010 nationwide survey of elementary schools, nearly half of all teachers
(48%) reported that they have heard students make sexist remarks at their school.4
Harassment based on failure to conform to sex stereotypes, which can also be a violation of
Title IX, also starts in elementary school. In the same 2010 study, researchers found that
one third of students (33%) have heard kids at school say that girls should not do or wear
certain things because they are girls, and 38% have heard their peers say that boys should

4

Id.

8
not do or wear certain things because they are boys.5 Students who do not conform to
traditional gender norms are more likely than their peers to say that they are called names,
ridiculed, or bullied at school (56% versus 33%).6
Sexual harassment changes little as students enter middle and high school. In a
nationwide survey of students in Grades 8-11, 81% reported experiencing sexual
harassment during their school lives.7 In a recent survey of 7th-12th-grade students, nearly
half (48%) experienced some form of sexual harassment during the 2010-2011 school year,
with a vast majority of those students (87%) reporting that the harassment had a negative
effect on them.8 Both studies found that girls were more likely than boys to have
experienced harassment. Among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students,
the numbers are even higher.9 In a study of LGBT students in Grades 6-12, 85% of the
respondents reported being verbally harassed, and 40% reported being physically harassed
at school because of their sexual orientation.10 Close to two thirds (64%) were verbally
harassed because of their gender expression.11 Another study found that LGBT youth were
twice as likely to have been verbally harassed at school as their non-LGBT peers.12

5

Id.
Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, Playgrounds and Prejudice: Elementary School Climate in
the United States (2012).
7
AAUW Education Foundation, Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing and Sexual Harassment in School 4
(2001).
8
Catherine Hill and Holly Kearl, AAUW, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School 2, (2011).
9
National Women’s Law Center, The Next Generation of Title IX: Harassment and Bullying Based on
Sex, 2011 at 1.
10
Id.
11
Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, The 2009 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in our Nation’s School, (2010).
12
Human Rights Campaign, Growing Up LGBT in America: HRC Youth Survey Report Key Findings, (2012).
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Sexual harassment can be extremely devastating for the victims, both in its
emotional effect and in its effect on their education.13 Experiencing school as an unsafe
place has been connected with poor academic performance, skipping school, and dropping
out.14 To demonstrate, a recent survey found that nearly one third (32%) of students who
were harassed reported not wanting to go to school as a result of the harassment, and girls
were more likely than boys to report that harassment affected them in this way.15
Females who drop out of school due to sexual harassment experience long-term
economic effects, which can be overwhelming. Young women who do not graduate from
high school have higher rates of unemployment than do young men who drop out.16
Female dropouts who do find jobs make considerably lower wages than do male dropouts.17
Women who do not have a high-school diploma are more likely to rely on safety-net
programs than are their male peers or men and women who have graduated from high
school and college.18 It is already known that men at every level of education make more
money than women with a similar educational background. This wage gap is particularly
high among high-school dropouts. Typically, a woman who starts but does not finish high
school is paid only 71% of what her male counterpart is paid.19 Female dropouts are more
likely to live in poverty than both men and women with higher educational achievement.20

13

14

15
16
17
18

19
20

National Women’s Law Center, The Next Generation of Title IX: Harassment and Bullying Based on Sex,
2011 at 2.
AAUW Education Foundation, Hostile Hallways: Bullying, Teasing and Sexual Harassment in school 4
(2001).
Catherine Hill and Holly Kearl, AAUW, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School 2 (2011).
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Study (2011).
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic Survey.
National Women’s Law Center, The Next Generation of Title IX: Harassment and Bullying Based on Sex,
2011 at 2.
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic Survey.
Id.
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Children raised in these situations may find it difficult to escape poverty themselves. As a
consequence, the long-term economic impact of sex-based harassment on women and their
families can be overwhelming.
The prevalence of student-on-student sexual harassment is so concerning that the
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR) issued a “Dear Colleague” letter in
April 2011 regarding sexual harassment. The OCR is the federal agency responsible for
enforcing Title IX in schools that receive federal funds from the U.S. Department of
Education. The OCR considers this letter a “significant guidance document” that should be
followed as best practices when addressing student-on-student sexual harassment. The
“Dear Colleague” letter highlights and reminds schools of their responsibilities under the
federal statute Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
As stated earlier as the other side of the problem, Title IX as a means of
enforcement has evolved since its enactment in 1972. The evolution of Title IX’s
enforcement was due mainly to the negative effects that sexual discrimination leaves upon
its victims. With this enforcement, as well as known negative effects, comes inevitable
litigation brought by the student victims of harassment. Litigation can prove to be costly to
school districts. Juries have awarded monetary damages for Title IX liability in the range
of $27,000 to $300,000 in a number of cases.21 These jury decisions can give school
districts an idea of what students who can prove Title IX liability can receive.22 Then there

21

22

Juries have awarded damages of the following amounts: $27,000; $60,000; $125,000; $175,000;
$220,000; and $300,000. The Cost of Harassment 1, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/files
/pdfs/Igbt/schoolsyouth/costofharassment.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) [hereinafter The Cost of
Harassment]; see also Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 258, 264 (6 th Cir. 2000).
The Cost of Harassment, supra note 181, at 1.
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are the cases that are settled out of court. In one case, the victim student received $962,000
in the settlement agreement.23 In another case, the victim student received $1.1 million in
the settlement agreement.24 It should also be noted that there are also cases where victims
seek, and are granted, summary judgment because the facts of the case are so one sided they
didn’t need to be tried.
School administrators need to have a strong understanding of school law and how it
pertains to public education. Most administrators get at least one or two school law courses
during their formal education. These classes are usually reserved for the more notable
cases and most frequently used aspects of school law. Others school administrators learn
through experience, which can result in either a positive or negative outcome. This will
solely depend on the actions or inactions taken by the school administrator in a particular
situation. A lot of times these decisions are made instinctively and are not based upon
actuall requirements of the law. This can also be the case with Title IX and the legal
requirements to address student-on-student sexual harassment.
The framework for legal responsibility under Title IX for student-on-student sexual
harassment comes from the 1999 landmark United States Supreme Court case Davis v.
Monroe.25 In Davis, the Supreme Court created a three-prong test intended to guide lower
federal courts in the determination of a school district’s responsibility for a Title IX
violation due to its actions or inactions regarding student-on-student sexual harassment. It

23

24
25

Student: Know Your Rights, Southern Poverty Law Center, http://www.spicenter.org/what-wedo/lgbtrights/students-know-your-rights (last visited May 29, 2015).
Id.
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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is the aim of this research to investigate the application of the Davis test and to analyze any
patterns and/or findings to help school administrators understand and prevent Title IX
liability if taken to court.
Significance of the Study
The Supreme Court decided Davis on May 24, 1999. This decision was the
culmination of a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions examining sexual harassment as a
form of discrimination under Title IX. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s attempt to
protect children from unwanted sexual situations, through this decision Davis may have
proven to be more confusing than helpful for lower courts to follow. In deciding Davis, the
U.S. Supreme Court had to determine when a school district could be found liable for
student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX. Although the Supreme Court has
articulated the standard of school liability for student-on-student sexual harassment, the
lower federal courts have been left to determine the details according to the standard’s
substance.
The standard adopted in Davis is a three-prong test.26 Each of the prongs must be
present for a recipient of federal funds to be found liable for peer sexual harassment under
Title IX. The test is:
1.

The harassment must be so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it

denies the victim of educational opportunities and benefits;

26

26

See Tamar Meyouhas, Eleventh Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law: Educational Law Chapter:
Sexual harassment in Education, 11 Geo. J. Gender & L. 297, 306 (2010). The author states that Davis
formulated a three-factor standard for the school's Title IX liability, applicable in both teacher-student and
student-student situations.
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999).
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2.

The school must have actual knowledge of the harassment; and

3.

The school must have remained deliberately indifferent to the harassment.

Many questions still remain with the particulars of the three-prong test. For
example, how much harassment is required before it is considered “severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive?”27 Who within the school district must have knowledge before the
school board is deemed to have “actual knowledge?” Does a teacher with knowledge of the
harassment satisfy the actual knowledge standard, or must it be an actual member of the
school board? Can the person with knowledge be the principal, a custodian, or a school bus
driver? What exactly must a school official do to avoid liability under the deliberateindifference standard? What constitutes being “deprived of access to the educational
opportunities or benefits provided by the school?”
These are just a few of the questions that Davis has left to the lower federal courts.
At the time of this study, multiple cases concerning student-on-student sexual harassment
have been decided since the Supreme Court decision in Davis. In each case, the lower
federal court has attempted to determine the details of the elements of each standard of
liability and fill the gaps left by Davis. In all of the cases decided to date, the lower federal
courts have grappled with one or more of the three prongs in the Davis test in an effort to
determine whether a school board should be found liable for student-on-student sexual
harassment.
One question that needs to be answered is: How have the lower federal courts
interpreted the Davis test with regard to school-board liability for student-on-student sexual

27

Id.
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harassment? This study’s purpose is to determine the state of the law in the area of schooldistrict liability for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 since the Supreme Court decision of Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education.28 Specifically, this study intends to survey the treatment of such liability in
the nation’s lower federal courts, specifically the federal court of appeals and federal
district courts. Through this study’s analysis of this issue, educators can become better able
to recognize and address actionable peer sexual harassment in their schools and prevent
Title IX liability.

Research Questions
This study investigated the following research questions:
1.

How have lower federal courts interpreted the Davis decision regarding

school-district liability for student-on-student sexual harassment?
2.

What inferences can be gleaned from Davis and post-Davis case law to

enable school districts to establish policies to address student-on-student sexual harassment
to prevent liability?

28

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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Delimitations of the Study
This study analyzed judicial decisions focusing upon public schools in the U.S.
Furthermore, all the decisions used in this study have come from the U.S. Supreme Court,
U.S. circuit courts, and U.S. district courts. The initial search yielded 94 court cases citing
the Davis decision. Of the 94 cases, 26 were used for this study. These cases were chosen
because they met the parameters of this study. The parameters are that each case must have
been a federal appellate court case, must have taken place in a K-12 public school, and must
have been a case of student-on-student sexual harassment.
Cases from state courts were not included. Although state courts sometimes
interpret federal laws, the federal courts’ interpretations of federal law generally carry more
persuasive weight. Rulings issued by federal courts are more authoritative interpretations
of federal laws than those of state courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court has the final
definitive say on issues regarding federal civil rights law.

Limitations of the Study
In this study I conducted an extensive search for federal court decisions pertaining
to public school officials’ and/or school districts’ liability for student-on-student sexual
harassment. However, because not all court decisions are published, it is possible that there
is additional case law on this subject.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

A History of School Liability for Sexual Harassment

Sexual Harassment Suits Had Their Origins in the Workplace
Before sexual harassment became a legal issue in school, it first appeared as a legal
cause of action in the employment field. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 included Title VII, a
clause prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or
religion.29 Title VII applies to both men and women, but it was initially enacted in part as a
way to protect women in the workplace.30 This legislation opened the door for suits
brought by women suffering from sexual harassment at work by providing a legal basis for
their claims.31
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released
guidelines outlining what constituted sexual harassment in the workplace.32 These
guidelines stated that sexual harassment was considered to be a form of sexual

29
30
31
32

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (2006).
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
n163 Mentor Savings Bank, FSB. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a) (2008). The regulations define sexual harassment as:
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature . . . when:
1. submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment,
2. submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or
3. such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
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discrimination proscribed by Title VII. The EEOC definition of sexual harassment
encompasses two types of harassment: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment
harassment.33 Quid pro quo harassment exists “when submission to verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature is an explicit term or condition of employment. It applies when
a supervisor conditions a tangible benefit on sexual favors and punishes the subordinate
who does not comply.”34 Quid pro quo harassment is encompassed in the first two
elements of the EEOC definition of sexual harassment.35 The second type of harassment is
“hostile-environment” harassment, which occurs when “supervisors and/or co-workers
create an atmosphere that is ‘so infused with hostility toward members of one sex’ that it
alters the working environment.”36 Hostile-environment harassment is encompassed in the
third element of the EEOC definition.37
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson further delineated these two
types of sexual harassment.38 In this case, a female bank employee brought a sexualharassment suit against the bank and her supervisor under Title VII, claiming that her
supervisor coerced her into a sexual relationship by threatening her job.39 In addition, the
petitioner claimed that her boss “fondled her in front of other employees,” “exposed himself
to her” in the women's restroom, and “forcibly raped her on several occasions.”40 She

33

34

35
36

37
38
39
40

“Quid pro quo” literally translates into “this for that.” Monica L. Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play:
School Liability Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, n.31 (1993).
Amy M. Rubin, Peer Sexual Harassment: Existing Harassment Doctrine and Its Application to School
Children, 8 Hastings Women’s L.J. 141, 143-44 (1997).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2008).
Amy M. Rubin, Peer Sexual Harassment: Existing Harassment Doctrine and Its Application to School
Children, 8 Hastings Women’s L. J. 141, 143-44 (1997).
n169 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2008).
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id. at 60.
Id.
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stated that her fear of her supervisor prevented her from utilizing the bank’s complaint
procedure, which actually required her to report the problem to her supervisor, the very
individual responsible for the harassment.41 The supervisor denied the allegations in their
entirety.
The district court ultimately denied relief, concluding that there had been no sexual
harassment. The holding stated that if there had been a sexual relationship, that relationship
had been consensual, and therefore, the woman’s job had not been in jeopardy.42 The court
further explained that even if it had found harassment, the bank, in this instance, was not
liable because it had never been notified.43
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, both on the
finding that there had been no harassment and on the determination that the bank was not
liable.44 The case was remanded based on the fact that the district court had considered
only quid pro quo harassment and neglected to consider hostile-environment harassment.45
Regarding the bank’s liability, the appellate court held the bank to a strict liability standard
and stated “an employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by supervisory
personnel, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the
misconduct.”46
The Supreme Court reiterated the fact that hostile-environment harassment is
justified as a cause of action. Loss or threat of loss of a monetary nature--quid pro quo

41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 61.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.

19
harassment--is not required for sexual harassment to occur. However, the Court qualified
its ruling by stating that in order for the conduct to rise to the level of hostile-environment
sexual harassment, “it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”47
Regarding employer liability, the Supreme Court declined to set a “definitive rule”
that would hold the employer to a strict liability standard.48 Rather, it concurred with the
view expressed in the EEOC amicus brief, stating that courts determining employer liability
in sexual-harassment suits should “look to agency principles for guidance in this area.”49
The EEOC wrote that in cases of hostile-environment harassment, the employer should not
be held to a strict liability standard, which would make him or her responsible for any and
all harassment on the part of his employees, regardless of knowledge.50 Instead, the EEOC
recommended that the Court consider whether the employee had the opportunity to seek
help and show evidence that the employer had “actual knowledge of the harassment.”51

Sexual Harassment Expands to the Educational Setting
Sexual-harassment law was extended to the school system by Title IX. Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in schools that receive
federal education funding.52 Title IX mirrors the language of Title VI of the Civil Rights

47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 67.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.
U.S. Const. Amend. IX § 1.
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Act of 1964.53 The purpose of Title VI was to end discrimination based on race, color, or
national origin in any program receiving federal funding, including educational settings.
Title IX was enacted to end sex discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal
funds. The author of Title IX, Senator Birch Bayh, stated, “Discrimination against the
beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately, the prohibition does not apply to
discrimination on the basis of sex.”54 Bayh said that he wanted to guarantee, through
legislation, that all Americans, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex,
could “enjoy the educational opportunity they deserve.”55 Bayh also said, “Sex
discrimination reaches into all facets of education, including admission, scholarship
programs, faculty hiring and promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales.”56 As it was
originally written, Title IX was limited to administrative enforcement actions brought by
the federal government.57 However, by 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case Cannon
v. University of Chicago, recognized that Title IX could be used as a cause of action for
employees and students seeking money damages for sexual discrimination in educational
programs receiving federal funds.58

53
54

55

56

57

58

U.S. Const. Amend. VI § 1.
C. Scott Williams, Schools, Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 51 Baylor L. Rev., Fall 1999, at 1087, 1091.
C. Scott Williams, Schools, Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 51 Baylor L. Rev., Fall 1999, at 1087, 1091.
C. Scott Williams, Schools, Peer Sexual Harassment, Title IX, and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 51 Baylor L. Rev., Fall 1999, at 1087, 1091.
Paul M. Secunda, At The Crossroads of Title IX and a New “Idea”: Why Bullying Need Not Be “A
Normal Part of Growing Up” for Special-Education Children, 12 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y, 2005, at 1,
7.
Kathy Lee Collins, Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment Under Title IX: The Legal and Practical
Issues, 46 Drake L. Rev., 1998, at 789, 793.
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Cannon v. University of Chicago59
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,60 a female student who was denied admission
to the medical school at the University of Chicago brought a Title IX claim, stating that the
school was discriminating against her on the basis of sex.61 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint.62 Cannon appealed the district court’s
decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the dismissal by the
district court.63 The Seventh Circuit Court held that the plaintiff had no private cause of
action under Title IX.64 Cannon eventually applied for certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded the holding,
stating that a Title IX plaintiff had a private right cause of action.65
In coming to its decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of
Title IX and found that Congress had, first, intended to end the use of federal funds in
discriminatory programs and, second, wanted to provide citizens protection from
discriminatory practices.66 The Supreme Court inferred that Congress had intended to
provide a private right of action under Title IX, although the language authorizing a private
cause of action was not included in Title IX.

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Id.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1258.
Id.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F.2d. 1063, 1064.
Id.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 695 (1979).
Id. at 694.
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The Supreme Court determined that a victim of sexual harassment was a member of
the class that Congress had intended to protect with Title IX.67 The Court also determined
that Congress had patterned Title IX after Title VI, which contained a private-right cause of
action, and that a private cause of action would advance the objective of Title IX by
ensuring that individual citizens would be protected from sex-based discrimination.68 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the university received federal funding and the plaintiff had
been excluded from the university on the basis of her sex.69 These facts were enough to
establish a cause of action under Title IX. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the lower court’s decision and held that the plaintiff could pursue a private cause
of action under Title IX against the university.70

Franklin v. Gwinnett71
Thirteen years after Cannon, the Supreme Court took the next developmental step in
the advancement of Title IX litigation, the actual-knowledge standard.72 In Franklin v.
Gwinnett,73 a female high-school student alleged that she was sexually harassed on at least
three occasions by a teacher.74 She claimed that the teacher forcibly kissed her in the
school parking lot, telephoned her at home, engaged her in sexually explicit conversations,
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and interrupted one of her classes to take her to a private office, where he sexually assaulted
her.75 Franklin alleged that other teachers and administrators knew about the harassment
but took no action to stop the sexual harassment and discouraged her from pressing charges
against the teacher.76
In spite of the serious allegations, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia dismissed Franklin’s complaint, stating that “Title IX does not authorize an award
of damages.”77 Franklin appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision.78 Franklin then petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately
reversed the circuit court’s decision and stated that “where legal rights have been invaded
and federal statute provides a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”79 Therefore, the Supreme Court
recognized that monetary damages were an appropriate remedy for a Title IX violation.
The Franklin decision is important, not just because it recognized damages as an
appropriate remedy but also because it analogized sexual harassment in the workplace to
sexual harassment in the schools. The Supreme Court stated,
Unquestionably, Title IX places on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the
duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor
discriminates on the basis of sex. We believe the same rule should apply
when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.80
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Gebser v. Lago Vista81
The question that still remains from Franklin is how and when a school district is
responsible for the sexual harassment of students by a third party. It is possible for a school
district to be held liable, but what constitutes liability for teacher-on-student sexual
harassment?82 In 1998, the Supreme Court finally determined the standard of liability that
applies to teacher-on-student sexual harassment in school in Gebser v. Lago Vista.83 In this
case, Alida Gebser was in eighth grade when she joined a book discussion group led by
Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista High School.84 Gebser alleged that during the
discussion sessions Waldrop made sexually suggestive comments.85 Upon entering high
school, Gebser was enrolled in one of Waldrop’s classes. During class, Waldrop continued
to make sexually suggestive comments and began to direct the comments toward Gebser.86
In the spring of her freshman year, Waldrop kissed and fondled Gebser when visiting her at
home.87 On a number of occasions throughout the school year, the two had sexual
intercourse. This relationship continued into the following year, and although the two often
engaged in sexual activity during school hours, it never took place on school property.88
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During this time, parents of other students complained to the administration about
what they believed were inappropriate comments made by Waldrop during his courses.89
The principal did discuss the complaints with Waldrop, but he failed to notify the school
superintendent, who was the school district’s Title IX coordinator. A few months later, a
police officer discovered Waldrop and Gebser engaged in sexual activity and arrested
Waldrop.90 In the wake of the arrest, the school immediately terminated Waldrop’s
employment.
The Gebsers eventually brought a Title IX claim against the school district in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for the sexual harassment of their
daughter. The district court rejected the Title IX claim, stating that in order to be liable, a
school district must have actual notice of the alleged harassment.91 The district court held
that in this case “the evidence presented was inadequate to raise a genuine issue on whether
the school district had actual or constructive notice that Waldrop was involved in a sexual
relationship with a student.”92 The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s opinion and held that a school district is not
liable for teacher-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX unless the school board or
the proper employee knew or should have known of the abuse and that person had the
power to end the abuse and failed to do so.93
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The case was eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
responded to the lower court’s decisions, centering its opinion on the question of whether a
school should be held liable for the acts of employees when the school itself did not know
about the harassment.94 In the opinion, the Court distinguished Title IX from Title VII,
stating that although Title VII’s goal is to “eradicate discrimination throughout the
economy” and to compensate victims, “Title IX focuses more on protecting individuals
from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds.”95 The Supreme
Court held that damages were appropriate only when an official who, at a minimum, has the
authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient’s behalf also has actual knowledge and fails to respond adequately.96 Restated,
the Supreme Court’s decision created a two-prong test to determine liability, and that test
states that (a) a qualified school official must have actual knowledge and (b) the school
official’s failure to stop the harassment must equate to deliberate indifference.97

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 98
The case law that the Supreme Court had decided to 1998 clearly identified sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination actionable under Title IX. However, the
Supreme Court had not yet decided whether schools could be liable for student-on-student
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sexual harassment and under what standard. Not until 1999 did the Supreme Court finally
set forth the requisite legal standard in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education99 for
student-on-student sexual harassment. The lasting impact of the Davis opinion is the
Supreme Court’s three-prong test determining school-district liability for student-on-student
sexual harassment that violates Title IX.
The facts of the case are as follows. Lashonda Davis was a fifth-grade student at
Hubbard Elementary School in Monroe County, Georgia. According to Lashonda’s
mother, in December 1992, a classmate named G.F. tried to touch Lashonda’s breast and
genitals and made inappropriate statements, such as, “I want to get in bed with you” and “I
want to feel your boobs.”100 Two more verbal incidents occurred on or around January 4
and January 20, 1993. Lashonda reported the incidents to her mother and her classroom
teacher. After hearing about the incidents, Lashonda’s mother contacted the teacher.
Lashonda’s teacher assured the mother that the principal had been told about the incidents,
but Lashonda’s mother claimed that no action was taken against the boy.101
In February, G.F. allegedly placed a doorstop in his pants and acted in a sexually
suggestive manner toward Lashonda during physical education (PE) class.102 Lashonda
told the PE teacher about the incident, but no discipline was issued to the boy. One week
later, G.F. again harassed Lashonda in PE under the supervision of another classroom
teacher. Lashonda claimed that she again reported the incident to that teacher. Lashonda’s
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mother even followed up with both teachers to discuss the incidents. In March, G.F.
harassed Lashonda again, but this time it took place in the hallway. Lashonda claimed that
he rubbed his body against her in a sexually suggestive manner, and she again reported the
incident to her teacher.103
The harassment finally ended in mid-May when Lashonda’s mother, Davis, pressed
charges against G.F. through the police department.104 Lashonda’s mother decided to
pursue this course of action because the school failed to prevent the harassment of
Lashonda. G.F. was eventually charged and convicted of sexual battery for his misconduct
and behavior toward Lashonda.105 Lashonda alleged that she had been affected in many
ways because of the harassment. Lashonda’s grades dropped, and her father had discovered
a suicide note in April 1993.106 In May 1994, Davis filed suit against the school district in
the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for not protecting her daughter
from the harassment. In her complaint, she alleged that the district, a recipient of federal
funding for purposes of Title IX, was deliberately indifferent to the boy’s harassment of
Lashonda, creating an intimidating and hostile school environment in violation of Title
IX.107
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed the Title IX
claim. It its analysis, the court held that the school could not be held liable for the sexual
harassment of Lashonda because the school itself did not commit the sexual harassment.
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Because another student, and not the school, committed the harassment, there was no
connection to Title IX liability.108
Davis appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and a three-judge panel reversed the district court’s decision. The court of
appeals recognized Title IX as a vehicle for relief when a school official’s failure to take
action against reported peer sexual harassment creates a hostile environment.109 The school
district filed a motion for rehearing, and the court of appeals sitting en banc affirmed the
district court’s dismissal.110 The court of appeals, en banc, determined that Title IX does
not provide adequate grounds for damages in a private cause of action, even in situations in
which the peer harassment creates a hostile learning environment and school officials
knowingly fail to act to prevent the harassment.111 In its reasoning, the court of appeals
held that Title IX was passed pursuant to Congress’s legislative authority under the
Spending Clause; therefore, recipients must be provided adequate notice of the conditions
they are assuming upon acceptance.112 The court reasoned that the language of Title IX
adequately notifies recipients that they must stop employees from engaging in
discriminatory conduct, but does not give sufficient notice of a duty to prevent peer sexual
harassment.113
After the en banc court of appeals decision, Davis petitioned for writ of certiorari to
have the U.S. Supreme Court review the court-of-appeals decision. Certiorari was granted
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so the Supreme Court could resolve the conflict in the lower courts regarding two specific
matters of law. The first matter of law is whether a recipient of federal education funding
can be held liable for damages under Title IX in any circumstances of discrimination in the
form of student-on-student sexual harassment.114 The second matter of law is whether a
school district’s failure to respond to student-on-student sexual harassment in its schools
allows a victim to file suit for monetary damages.115
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion for the Court. In a 5-to-4 vote, the
majority answered in the affirmative on both issues in question. The majority’s opinion
focused on the Supreme Court’s previous decisions in Gebser and Franklin regarding
claims for Title IX liability, what the purpose of Title IX is, and implications of the
language that Title IX puts on recipients. In its conclusion, the Court held that a recipient
of federal education funding might be liable for damages for discrimination, under Title IX,
for a school’s unreasonable response to student-on-student sexual harassment.116
The Court first defined the scope of a recipient’s responsibility under Title IX,
requiring that schools proactively attempt to cease sexual harassment. Using the
“deliberately indifferent” standard the United States Supreme Court applied in Gebser, the
Court stressed that liability does not stem from the harassment from a third party.117
Liability comes from the federal-funding recipient’s own decision to remain deliberately
indifferent to student-on-student sexual harassment of which it had actual knowledge.
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Deliberate indifference to actual notice of sexual harassment amounts to an intentional
violation of Title IX.118
Furthermore, the Court restated that the use of the deliberate-indifference standard
should be applied narrowly to instances in which the funding recipient has substantial
control over the harasser and the authority to take remedial action.119 The Court pointed out
that the custodial nature of the school setting effectively demands school officials to
proscribe acceptable norms of conduct that must be adhered to by students, and the
adequate disciplinary measures must be taken in response to the conduct that goes against
these norms.120
The Court also held that a private cause of action can be taken against recipients
who fail to fulfill their duty under Title IX.121 It was stated firmly that the regulatory
scheme surrounding Title IX, along with the Department of Education’s requirement that
recipients monitor the conduct of third parties in order to prevent discrimination, provides
funding recipients with adequate notice that they may be liable for failing to respond to
discriminatory acts of certain nonagents, such as students.122
In concluding that recipients may be liable for their deliberate indifference to known
acts of peer sexual harassment, it was also stressed that the Supreme Court’s decision
should not force administrators to adhere to rigid disciplinary procedures and directed lower
courts to “refrain from second guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school
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administrators.”123 The majority rejected directly the dissent’s mischaracterization of the
standard as schools needing to provide remedy to victims of peer harassment.124 The
majority clarified by stating that a recipient’s response should be deemed deliberately
indifferent only if it was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”125
The majority also criticized the dissent’s126 assumption that by providing relief under Title
IX, situations would occur in which victims would demand specific action to prevent
student-on-student harassment and threaten suits if they were not followed.127
Finally, the majority focused on the level of severity to which the harassment must
rise before a recipient would be held liable. In deciding this, the Court focused its analysis
on the terms of Title IX in order to adhere to its objectives.128 The Court stated that Title
IX not only protects students from discrimination but it also ensures that they are not
excluded from participating in, or denied the benefits of, programs or activities offered by
an educational institution.129 Consequently, in order to have a claim for damages, the
harassment must be so overt and offensive that it physically deprives or “so undermines and
detracts from the victims’ education experience” that it effectively causes a denial of equal
access to the recipient’s resources.130
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In the conclusion, the majority strongly criticized the dissent for failing to
appreciate the limits set by the majority, which should not be wrongly interpreted for
providing damages for simple name-calling and playground teasing.131
After the Court communicated the standards established by the majority that
determine when a school is liable for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX,
the Court applied the standards to the facts in Davis. The Court determined that Davis
sufficiently demonstrated a causal link between the misconduct of G.F. and the severe
decline in Lashonda’s grades to provide the requisite showing of a potential denial of equal
access to survive a dismissal.132 The Court remanded the case to the lower court and
directed the appellate court to be cautious in applying the standard set by the majority,
recognizing its limits when examining whether the pervasiveness, severity of the actions,
and the recipients’ alleged knowledge and deliberate indifference entitled Lashonda to
relief.133
The lasting impact of the Davis case is the Supreme Court’s three-prong test to
determine school-district liability for student-on-student sexual harassment that violates
Title IX. All prongs of the test are required to establish liability. The three-prong test is:
1.

Was the harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it

denied the victim of his/her educational opportunities?
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2.

Did the school have actual knowledge of the harassment?

3.

If the school had knowledge, did it remain deliberately indifferent?

Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 654.
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Relevant Case Law Post-Davis
Since the ruling in Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court has not heard another case of
student-on-student sexual harassment. This leaves researchers to look toward the lower
federal courts to determine how the standards established in Davis have been used to
determine Title IX liability. The initial search yielded 94 court cases citing the Davis
decision. Of the 94 cases, 26 were used for this study. These cases were chosen because
they met the parameters of this particular study. The parameters are that they each case had
to have been a federal appellate court case, must have taken place in a K-12 public school,
and must have been a case of student-on-student sexual harassment. These parameters were
chosen because they narrowly identify the types of institutions and administrators that this
research aims to assist.
The majority of the following post-Davis case law reviewed is from federal
appellate court cases applying Davis to determine school district liability. It should be noted
that there are a number of district court cases that have been decided and reviewed.134
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These cases were not utilized in this study because these courts must turn to their circuit
court of appeals for binding guidance. Federal appellate courts were chosen because they
have binding authority over the federal district courts in their circuit, which is why many of
those cases are not a part of this literature review.
In addition, at the end of this section, several federal district court cases addressing
peer-on-peer gender nonconformity are reviewed because this issue has yet to reach the
federal appellate courts.135 These cases are significant to review because this is an
emerging issue for schools.136
The decisions are discussed in chronological order and give a detailed description of
the facts in each case. This detailed focus on the facts is significant for school
administrators because the application of the Davis test is fact-specific.
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Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology137
In an unpublished opinion, the Seventh Circuit Court became the first to hear an
appeal of a post-Davis peer sexual harassment case. Because this case was unpublished,
there are few publicly known facts. The facts that are known are as follows: Adusumilli
alleged that on 12 separate occasions, four male professors and six male students (who were
also police officers) had subjected her to sexual harassment.138 She also alleged that after
complaining about the harassment, she was given “unfair grades.”139 The district court
ruled that she had failed to state a Title IX claim and dismissed her complaint. She
appealed.
The four alleged acts of harassment by the professors involved “ogling” and
“unwanted touching” of her arm and back.140 Five of the eight student acts involved similar
touching of the hand, shoulder, back and leg. One of the other three incidents involved a
kiss on the cheek at graduation. The last two incidents involved touching of the top and
bottom of Adusumilli’s breast.141 She complained about only two of the incidents to school
officials: the touching of her right shoulder by a student named “Sam” and the touching of
her breast by another student.142 The court stated that the Illinois Institute of Technology
(ITT) could have known of the incidents only if Adusumilli had complained about them to
school officials, as required under Gebser and Davis.143 Adusumilli never alleged that any
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of the professors were themselves school officials. The court then looked at the two
incidents that were actually reported. The court saw those as single incidents of student
misconduct. Each incident ceased as soon as it occurred and was not repeated.144 The court
stated that it was convinced that neither incident involved “pervasive” and “offensive”
harassment of the type that would be actionable under Title IX.145
The court also disposed of the retaliation claim by reviewing her complaint and
deciding that Adusumilli herself recounted a “variety of grounds” for the poor grades. She
had, in essence, pleaded “herself out of court.”146 The district court’s determination was
affirmed.

Murrell v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado
The Tenth Circuit Court was next to address a post-Davis peer sexual harassment
case in Murrell v. District No. 1 Denver Colorado,147 decided in 1999, the same year as
Davis. The facts of the case are as follows: Penelope Jones was born with spastic cerebral
palsy. This disability impaired her ability to use and control the right side of her body. She
was also deaf in her left ear, and testing revealed that she was developmentally disabled.
Penelope began school at George Washington High School in October 1993, where,
because of her special needs, she was placed into the special-education program. Within
this special-education program, another special-education student, John Doe, was known to
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have significant disciplinary and behavioral problems, which included sexually
inappropriate conduct.148 Even the boy’s mother had conveyed her concerns about her
son’s potential to harm others to teachers and the principal. She also informed them that he
was receiving treatment for his problems. Even with the school’s knowledge of John’s
sexually inappropriate conduct and behavioral problems, the school assigned him to a job
within the school as the “janitor’s assistant.”149 This job gave him the freedom to move
throughout the building freely and gave him access to unsupervised areas in the school.
Beginning in November 1993, the teachers found that John had been displaying
sexually inappropriate behavior toward Penelope. According to the lawsuit, John sexually
assaulted Penelope on several occasions during this time. It was alleged that John took her
to a secluded area of the building and sexually assaulted her.150 Penelope, who was
menstruating at the time, bled and vomited on herself during the assault.151 The janitor
walked in on the assault and told John and Penelope to clean up the mess and took them
back to class.152 The janitor informed the teacher of the incident, and the teacher tied
clothing around Penelope’s waist to cover up the blood. The teacher told her mother that
she had menstrual blood on her clothes, but the teacher never told the mother about the
assault. Penelope endured another assault by John on at least one other occasion. Penelope
even informed the teacher about the assault, but she was told not to tell her mother and to
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forget that the incident ever happened.153 After the assaults, Penelope began to display
suicidal behaviors that eventually led to her placement in a psychiatric hospital. At this
point, Penelope’s mother found out about the sexual assaults on her daughter by John. Her
mother immediately informed the school about the incidents, but the teacher denied that
they had ever happened. Penelope’s mother even left a message for the principal detailing
the assault, but the principal never responded to her call or investigated the allegations.154
Penelope returned to school in December 1993 after her release from the hospital.
Her return was short-lived due to another assault at the hands of John and the teasing she
had to endure from other students regarding the incidents. Her mother tried again to contact
the principal but was still unsuccessful in eliciting a response. She eventually learned from
a teacher that a meeting was taking place with John’s mother to discuss the sexual assault
on Penelope and that the principal would be attending, and she was able to schedule herself
into the meeting.155 In the meeting, Penelope’s mother alleged that the teachers and the
principal were hostile toward herself and her daughter and alleged that the principal
suggested that the sexual contact between the two students was consensual.156 However,
Penelope was legally incapable of consenting to the conduct with John, and John even
admitted assaulting her after she resisted him. Even after the admission by John, the
principal declined to investigate the assault. The school district also did not notify law
enforcement about the assaults after they were reported.157
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Penelope’s mother eventually brought suit against the school district in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado on behalf of her daughter Penelope. She claimed
that the school district had violated Title IX based on the school districts “alleged
knowledge of and failure to remedy the sexual harassment of Penelope by John.”158
Because the Supreme Court’s ruling in Davis had yet to be decided, the district court based
its ruling on the Fifth Circuit Court’s opinion in the 1996 case Rowinsky v. Bryan
Independent School District,159 which held that agency principles do not apply under Title
IX and a school district is not liable for the conduct of a harassing student because the
student is not an agent of the school.160 Subsequently, the case was appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
After the oral argument on the appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to
abate the case pending the Supreme Court’s review of Davis.161 Relying on the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Davis, the Tenth Circuit Court began its analysis by noting that Davis
states that a recipient of federal funds may be liable in damages under Title IX only for its
own misconduct, but liability would only apply if the district remained deliberately
indifferent to acts of harassment of which it has actual knowledge.162 The purpose of the
standard is to make a school district liable only when it has made a conscious decision to
permit sex discrimination in its programs. Liability would not lie where those with
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authority to respond to the harassment lacked knowledge of it. Without knowledge, a
district can do nothing to remedy the harassment.
The Tenth Circuit Court echoed Davis and noted that the deliberate-indifference
standard makes sense only to the extent that a funding recipient has some control over the
alleged harassment.163 Moreover, a recipient’s liability is limited to “situations wherein it
exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known
harassment occurs.”164
In summarizing the Davis requirements, the court noted that:
A plaintiff must allege three factors to state a claim of school district liability
under Title IX. She must allege that the district (1) had actual knowledge of,
and (2) was deliberately indifferent to (3) harassment that was so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived the victim of access to
the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school. This
limited rule imposes liability only on those school districts that choose to
ignore Title IX’s mandate for equal educational opportunities.165
The task, therefore, was to apply this standard to the case at hand.
In light of the district’s argument stating that Title IX does not impose an
affirmative duty on educational institutions receiving federal financial assistance to prevent
students from sexually harassing or assaulting one another, the Tenth Circuit Court noted
that this contention “misconstrues the nature of liability Penelope’s mother sought to
impose.”166 As outlined in Davis, a person suing for damages under Title IX must show
that a school-district official had actual knowledge of the repeated sexual assault of
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Penelope and did nothing to attempt to stop them. Penelope’s mother sought exactly what
the plaintiff in Davis sought: to hold the district liable for its own intentional conduct that
violated the clear terms of Title IX.
The Tenth Circuit Court next considered whether the school district had actual
knowledge sufficient to hold it liable for peer sexual harassment. It first noted that Davis
had not expressly determined who within a school district had to have knowledge of the
alleged sexual harassment before the district became liable for failing to respond
appropriately.167 However, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s declaration that liability
would attach if the harassment took place during school activities or under the supervision
of school employees.168 The Tenth Circuit Court further noted the Supreme Court’s
reference to Doe v. University of Illinois, which held that a school district is liable if “a
school official who had actual knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school board
with the duty to supervise the harasser and the power to take action that would end such
abuse but failed to do so.”169
The court ruled that Ms. Murrell had sufficiently alleged actual knowledge and
deliberate indifference. Taking the allegations as true, Ms. Murrell had telephoned the
principal to discuss the harassment when her daughter was in the hospital. The principal,
therefore, had actual knowledge of the assaults, at least on those occasions, but took no
remedial action. In fact, the principal refused to investigate the matter or discipline Doe.
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The court found that there was “little room for doubt that the highest-ranking
administrator at the school exercised substantial control of Doe and the school environment
during school hours, and so her knowledge could be charged to the school district.”170 The
court concluded that the principal had responded to the harassment unreasonably “in light
of known circumstances.”171 Her complete refusal to investigate the claims of sexual
harassment constituted deliberate indifference on the part of the district. This would satisfy
the “actual notice” and deliberate-indifference standard established by Davis.
The Tenth Circuit Court next considered the “severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive/ denial of educational opportunities” standard. Taking Penelope’s allegations as
true, the court easily concluded that the harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive. The court also had little difficulty in concluding that Penelope was denied her
educational opportunities because of the school’s deliberate indifference. The court came
to this conclusion noting that she had become a danger to herself, she had to leave school to
be hospitalized, the principal suspended her, and finally, she became homebound because
of the harassment. The Tenth Circuit Court had determined that Murrell had satisfied each
of the Davis standards to establish school-district liability for student-on-student sexual
harassment and reversed the district court’s decision.
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Soper v. Hoben
During the same year, 1999, the Sixth Circuit Court was the next court to decide a
post-Davis student-on-student sexual harassment case. Soper v. Hoben, similar to Murrell,
involved the harassment, sexual molestation, and rape of a female special-education student
by her classmates.172 This case took place at Oxbow Elementary and Muir Middle School
of the Huron Valley Public Schools (HVPS). The plaintiff in this case was a little girl
named Renee. Renee was a mentally retarded foster child. She received special-education
services under the label of “educable mentally impaired” (EMI) because of her
disabilities.173 In 1993, when Renee was a student at Oxbow, Renee reported to her mother
that she and one of her male classmates left the school boundaries and he kissed her. Ms.
Soper, Renee’s mother, reported the incident to the classroom teacher.
In May 1994, during Renee’s individual education plan (IEP) meeting before
entering Muir Middle School, it was decided that Renee should continue in the EMI
program.174 Ms. Soper claimed that she informed the new teacher about the incident with
the boy at Oxbow, but the teacher denied she was ever told. In August 1994, at the
beginning of the school year, Ms. Soper attended an initial meeting with the teacher.
During this meeting, Ms. Soper expressed further concern about the same boy and claimed
that the boy had an abusive family background.175 She requested that her daughter not be
left alone with the boy. The school denied that the boy was a risk because of outcomes of
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psychological evaluations and prior observations. During a parent-teacher conference on
the evening of October 6, 1994, Ms. Soper raised some concerns she had regarding her
daughter. When Ms. Soper returned home, Renee told her that two other boys had fondled
her breasts and vagina at school in the back of the classroom when the teacher was outside
in the hallway.176 She also told her mother that the two boys were fondling her on the bus.
Most alarming, Renee told her mother that the boy from the Oxbow incident had raped her
at school.177
Ms. Soper reported the incidents to the teacher and the principal. She also reported
the incidents to the police. The teacher reported the incidents to Child Protective Services
and Renee’s other teachers. The school conducted an investigation and created a plan to
protect Renee in school. Part of this plan was to increase supervision, install windows in
the door in the classroom, put an extra aide in the classroom, create a hall-pass system, and
provide an aide on the bus. All three boys in the incidents were required to attend
counseling on how to function socially with the opposite sex.178 The police conducted a
criminal investigation that ended in criminal charges against the boy who had raped Renee
but not the two other boys. Upon receiving this information, the school suspended the boy
who had raped Renee but did not punish the other two boys.179 Renee’s parents then filed a
lawsuit with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the teacher,
principal, and school district for violating Title IX.
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At trial, the district court granted the school district’s motion for summary
judgment. Soper appealed. The court of appeals noted that to prevail on a claim of studenton-student sexual harassment, a plaintiff must meet the standards established in Davis.
The court of appeals determined that the rape, sexual abuse, and harassment that
Renee allegedly endured did meet “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive/denial of
educational opportunities” standards.180 However, on the other prongs of the Davis test, the
court determined that the school did not have actual knowledge of the harassment until after
the fact. Additionally, the Sopers failed to show that, once the school knew of the
harassment, the school acted with deliberate indifference.
Once they did learn of the incidents, they quickly and effectively corrected
the situation. Defendants immediately contacted the proper authorities,
investigated the incidents themselves, installed windows in the doors of the
special-education classroom, placed an aide in Harmala’s classroom, and
created student counseling sessions concerning how to function socially with
the opposite sex. Prior to ascertaining the results of the internal
investigations and police criminal investigation, defendants offered to
increase the supervision of Renee while in school and provide her an escort.
However, Ms. Soper chose to keep Renee at home. Ultimately, when
defendants were advised of the results of the criminal investigation, they
expelled Boy A. Regardless of Ms. Soper’s choice not to allow Renee to
return to school despite the accommodations, the HVPS District and the
HVPS Board did correct the situation as soon as they had notice of the
incidents.181
In its explanation, the court next noted that the plaintiff in Davis was able to show
that the school district subjected her to discrimination because it failed to respond in any
way over a period of five months to complaints of in-school misconduct perpetrated by a
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fellow student.182 In comparison, the prompt and thorough response by school officials to
the Sopers’ complaint was not clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.183
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s granting of summary
judgment for the school district.184

Reese v. Jefferson School District No. 14J185
In March 2000, the Ninth Circuit had its opportunity to apply the Davis test. The
facts are as follows: On Tuesday, May 27, 1997, four days after the last day of classes for
seniors, Jefferson High School sponsored “senior skip day” and transported members of the
senior class to a local state park.186 While at the park, the plaintiffs Monica Reese, Janel
Reese, Cassi Harr, and Corina Pruett hid in the stalls of the boys’ bathroom. When a group
of senior boys came into the bathroom to change clothes, the four girls ran out of the stalls
and threw water balloons at the boys.187
Prior to skip day, the school administrators had warned the students that if anyone
behaved inappropriately on the trip their participation in commencement would be
jeopardized.188 The commencement was scheduled for Friday, May 30. The vice principal
suspended the girls on May 28 after he received several complaints and after interviewing
several students about the incident.189
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The school board held a special meeting on the morning of May 30, which the girls
attended and where they were joined by parents and counsel. The girls admitted hiding in
the boys’ bathroom but argued that they were retaliating for several acts of harassment
committed by the boys during the school year.190 Prior to May 28, the plaintiffs had never
reported any harassment, and there was no evidence that the school district actually knew
prior to May 28 of the boys’ alleged harassment of the girls.191 The boys did not admit to
any misconduct, and the school district conducted no further investigation. The school
board concluded the special meeting by upholding the suspension of the girls.
The girls filed their claims under Title IX, alleging that the school district was liable
for the harassment allegedly committed by the boys during the year and for excluding the
plaintiffs from commencement. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted
summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not raise a genuine issue of material fact.192
The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In March 2000, the Ninth Circuit Court held that Jefferson School District was not
liable for the alleged harassment of female students by male students. The school district
was “not deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment of which it had actual knowledge” in
such a way as to “cause the plaintiffs to undergo harassment or make them liable or
vulnerable to it.”193
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The girls admitted that they had not reported the harassment to anyone in authority
until May 28, 1997, after they themselves were threatened with disciplinary action.194 By
that time, the school year had ended. There was no evidence that any harassment occurred
after the school district learned of the girls’ allegations. Under Davis, the school district
cannot be deemed to have “subjected” the plaintiffs to the harassment.195 The Ninth Circuit
Court also determined that the district court did not err in concluding that evidence of an
alleged threat by one female student to one of the girls, which was purportedly witnessed by
a teacher, did not raise an issue of material fact.196 This incident did not put the school
district on actual notice that the male students were committing worse and ongoing alleged
harassment or that the plaintiffs were being harassed so severely as to be deprived of
educational benefits.197

Vance v. Spencer County Public School District198
As if Soper v. Hoben had not offered the Sixth Circuit Court enough of a challenge
in the post-Davis era, it was faced, once again, with another peer sexual harassment case in
Vance v. Spencer County Public School District,199 which took place the same year, 2000.
Alma McGowen enrolled as a sixth grader in the Spencer County Public School District in
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November 1992. The sexual harassment and bullying began for Alma at Spencer School
from the beginning of the year. During her second day of school, Alma alleged that a group
of first graders yelled, “Oh there’s that German gay girl.”200 Alma reported the incident to
a school counselor, who then spoke with the students and gave a presentation on accepting
others. During the same school year, Alma was the focus of another reported taunt. When
she was riding on the bus, a high-school student asked her to describe oral sex to him.
Alma immediately told her mother and the school counselor. The school counselor
reported the incident to the principal, who then suspended the student from the bus.201
The following year, her seventh-grade year, the harassment and taunts reportedly
continued for Alma. In school, a student who was identified as the school principal’s
nephew approached Alma in front of other students and asked her if she was gay.202 Alma
reported the incident to the assistant principal, who tried to explain the incident away. He
claimed that the boys thought she was cute and suggested that she should just be friendly.203
On top of this, Alma was repeatedly shoved into walls, her book bag was grabbed, and
students stole and destroyed her homework. All these incidents were reported to the
academic counselor, who referred Alma to the youth advocate. The youth advocate told
Alma that he would see what could be done about the situation. However, there was
nothing he could do.
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During the fall of the same year, in gym class, a male classmate called her and other
female students “whores” and “motherfuckers,” hit them, snapped their bras, and grabbed
their buttocks.204 The same boy took materials from Alma’s bag. In one incident, Alma
tried to get her pen back from the student, and he stabbed her in the hand with the pen.205
This incident was reported to the gym teacher, but the boy, who was a school board
member’s son, was not disciplined.206
In the spring semester of Alma’s seventh-grade year, she was approached by a
group of students during a bathroom break. Two of the students in this group held her
hands as the others grabbed her hair and tried to pull off her skirt.207 During this assault,
one of the students told Alma that he was going to have sex with her, and he began to take
off his pants.208 Another student intervened and helped Alma. Alma did not report the
incident to a teacher this time, but when she went home that evening, she explained the
incident to her mother. Her mother wrote a letter to the principal explaining what
happened. The principal’s response was to have the classroom teacher speak to Alma and
the five students involved in the incident. Beyond having the meeting, no other disciplinary
action was taken against the students.209
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During the fall of her eighth-grade year, Alma continued to be harassed by other
students. Alma took it upon herself to notify the principal of her harassment. The principal
had the youth advocate meet with her to discuss the situation. During this meeting, Alma
gave the youth advocate a list of students who were consistently harassing her. The youth
advocate met with these students, but the harassment still continued. It reached a point
where Alma claimed she was propositioned or touched inappropriately in virtually every
class.210
On August 31, 1995, Alma withdrew from school. She had been diagnosed with
depression, and there had been no sign of the harassment stopping at school. On July 1,
1996, Alma’s family filed her complaint in the District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky. They alleged that the school district subjected her to intentional sexual
discrimination as a result of peer conduct in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.211 The district was granted summary judgment. The case would be
heard by the Sixth Circuit Court on appeal.
Comparing the facts in Davis to those before it, the Sixth Circuit Court stated that,
“as in Davis, Alma had submitted abundant evidence of both verbal and physical sexual
harassment.”212 According to the court, Alma had not only demonstrated several instances
of severe and pervasive harassment, but she had also shown circumstances of being denied
an education. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit Court pointed to the examples of Alma being
stabbed in the hand and having her shirt yanked off and her hair pulled.213 The court also
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noted that other students had attempted to disrobe her. This evidence, declared the court,
satisfied the severity and pervasiveness requirement of Davis.214
Moving to the notice requirement, the Sixth Circuit Court found this prong satisfied
because the district had irrefutable knowledge of Alma’s harassment, as both she and her
mother had made repeated numerous reports to the district’s teachers and principals.215
With regard to the question of deliberate indifference, the court held that the district
had not responded reasonably to known acts of harassment. As an example, the court cited
the fact that a student had stabbed Alma in the hand and the only response by the district
had been a lecture to the offending student.216 The court also noted that two male students
had held Alma as another took off his pants and others had pulled her hair and tried to rip
off her clothes, and the district’s response had been a lecture and no report of the incident to
law enforcement.217 These three incidents alone, not to mention the fact that the district had
continued to use the same ineffective methods, apparently to no avail, reflected a deliberate
indifference in light of the known circumstances.218
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit Court found that Alma had shown that she had
experienced sexual harassment so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
deprived her of education opportunities. She had also shown that the district had actual
knowledge of the harassment and responded with deliberate indifference. Thus, the court
held, Alma should have prevailed on her Title IX claim.219
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Gabrielle v. Park Forest220
Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard Gabrielle
v. Park Forest. The facts of the case are as follows: Gabrielle M. began kindergarten in
Mrs. Rosellie’s classroom at Beacon Hill School in the Park Forest-Chicago Heights School
District on August 31, 1998.
Gabrielle alleged that Jason L., another student in her class, began “bothering” her
on the first day of class.221 Gabrielle did not tell the teacher, principal or her parents about
Jason’s behavior. Starting in September, Gabrielle’s parent recognized that Gabrielle did
not want to go to school and was crying at the door when it was time to go.222 Her parents
also claimed that she began wetting her bed and having nightmares at this time as well.223
Beginning in October, the teaching assistant in Gabrielle’s class saw Jason jump on
Gabrielle’s back at recess. She separated the two, and Jason was suspended from recess for
the rest of the week.224 Later in the month, Mrs. Roselli saw Jason lean against Gabrielle
with his hands on his crotch.225 In response to the incident, Mrs. Roselli removed Jason
from the room and took him to the principal’s office.226 The principal was not in his office,
so Mrs. Roselli put Jason in time out, away from other students, and described Jason’s
behavior to the teaching assistant. Later that day, a student told a teaching assistant that
Jason unzipped his pants and showed other students his underwear while her back was
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turned.227 Again, Mrs. Roselli again took Jason to the principal’s office and informed the
principal of both incidents that had occurred that day.228 The principal told Jason that his
behavior was inappropriate and told him not to do it again.229 Mrs. Roselli and Jason then
returned to class, and again, Jason was separated from the other students. When school was
over, the teaching assistant called Jason’s mother and told her to call the principal about the
incidents that day.230
During the same week, Jason again unzipped his pants in class. The teaching
assistant separated Jason from the rest of the class. This time, Jason left his seat and
unzipped his pants in front of other boys.231 Jason was taken to the principal’s office, and
the principal called Jason’s mother. As a consequence for the behavior, Jason received a
half hour of after-school detention.232
A week later the teaching assistant noticed that Jason and a classmate had their
hands down each other’s pants during story time.233 The teaching assistant immediately
called the students over to her. At this time, the teaching assistant learned that another girl
was also putting her hands down other students’ pants. After the teaching assistant learned
of this, the students were sent to the school psychologist, and during the meeting with the
school psychologist, the students were told that their behavior was inappropriate and that
they should tell their parents or teachers when such things occurred.234

227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

56
The next day, Gabrielle’s mother went to the school to talk with the principal. After
the meeting, Gabrielle’s mother took her to lunch to speak with her privately, at which time
Gabrielle told her she did not want to go back to school because Jason had been doing
“nasty stuff” to her since her first day.235
After returning to school, Gabrielle’s mother told the teaching assistant about her
conversation and that Gabrielle had recently developed problems with nightmares and
bedwetting.236 That day, she also asked the principal to move Gabrielle to a different
classroom. Not only did the principal move Gabrielle, but he also suspended Jason from
school for two days.237 The next day, Gabrielle’s mother asked the principal that Jason
switch classrooms instead of Gabrielle. Initially the principal resisted, but eventually
transferred Jason after the mother threatened to remove Gabrielle from the school.238 It was
also agreed that Jason would have different lunch and recess times.
Jason was separated from the other students by lunch supervisors for a total of two
weeks.239 After that, Jason returned from isolation and rejoined the other students for
lunch, which included Gabrielle’s class. Jason and Gabrielle never ate together.240 Despite
this effort, it was alleged that during lunch, Jason told Gabrielle that he “wanted to play
with her funny ways” at recess.241 Gabrielle alleged that she also told her teacher and
principal that Jason continued to bother her. Gabrielle’s mother also alleged that she
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complained to the principal. According to the principal, he promptly rescheduled lunch for
Gabrielle’s class so that Jason and Gabrielle would not go to lunch or recess at the same
time.242
In early November, Gabrielle was experiencing bedwetting, insomnia, nightmares,
and loss of appetite, so her parents took her to her pediatrician.243 The doctor referred her
to a counselor, who diagnosed Gabrielle with acute stress disorder and separation anxiety
due to Jason’s behavior toward her.244
Sometime in the spring of 1999, Gabrielle’s parents asked the school district to
transfer her to another school. The school district agreed, and Gabrielle began first grade at
Algonquin School.245
At this time, Gabrielle’s parents brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against the principal for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and her school district under Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, alleging that that Jason’s conduct amounted to sexual harassment.
The court evaluated the district’s response to Jason’s behavior and found the
response to be adequate.246 The court found, therefore, that summary judgment was
appropriate on Gabrielle’s federal claim.
Gabrielle appealed her case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
On appeal, Gabrielle argued that the district court improperly granted summary judgment
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on her Title IX sexual harassment claim. Before the appeals court evaluated whether the
school district’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference, Davis required them to
examine the student-on-student harassing conduct itself to determine whether it was “so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it had a “concrete, negative effect” on the
victim’s access to education.247 The court identified a threshold question in this case of
whether a five- or six-year-old kindergartner can ever engage in conduct constituting
“sexual harassment” or “gender discrimination” under Title IX.248 The court stated that
common sense, at least, would reject any such extension of Title IX. Nevertheless, it is not
necessary to determine whether six-year-old Jason should carry the label of “sexual
harasser” as it can be assumed arguendo that Jason’s conduct was “sexual harassment.”249
Assuming that Jason’s conduct amounted to “sexual harassment,” bringing it within
the realm of Title IX, the court stated that an action under this statute “will lie only for
sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively
bars the victim’s access to educational opportunity or benefit.”250 In its analysis, the court
determined that most of the conduct alleged by Gabrielle was “so vague and unspecific that
it could not provide a basis to determine whether that conduct was severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive harassment.”251 Consequently, the court asserted, Gabrielle could
not avoid summary judgment by asserting general allegations that Jason “bothered” her by
doing “nasty stuff.”252 The court concluded, “In the context of peer harassment between
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five- and six-year-olds, such allegations are as indicative of teasing and name-calling as
they are of potentially actionable harassment, and thus, they provided no support for
Gabrielle’s claim.”253 The court also did not believe that she avoided summary judgment
because of the “unspecific testimony” that Jason wanted to play with her “funny ways” at
recess.254 Specific details are “necessary to evaluate the severity and pervasiveness of the
conduct, not to mention other requisite elements of a Title IX deliberate-indifference claim,
such as actual knowledge.”255
The court then turned to the specific instances of inappropriate conduct alleged by
Gabrielle and reported to school officials. This included Jason’s jumping on Gabrielle’s
and other students’ backs and kissing each other, Jason pulling his pants down in front of
other students, the computer-room incident, and the story-time incident.256 The court ruled
that the evidence in the record showed that the students involved were unaware of the
sexual nature of their behavior.257 This was confirmed by the school psychologist, who
determined that the children were “unaware of the seriousness” of their actions.258 In turn,
the courts determined that the children, then, were not engaging in knowingly sexual acts, a
fact that at a minimum detracts from the severity and offensiveness of their actions.259
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Furthermore, an action under Title IX exists when the harassment alleged denies a
victim equal access to education. For example, the harassment must have a “concrete,
negative effect” on the victim’s education.260 Some of the examples listed by the court
include “dropping grades, becoming homebound or hospitalized due to harassment, or
physical violence.”261 Here, the court concluded that “there was no evidence that Gabrielle
was denied access to an education. Although she was diagnosed with some psychological
problems, the record showed that her grades remained steady and her absenteeism from
school did not increase.”262
The court stated that “if they were to decide Jason’s actions were severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive sexual harassment that had a concrete, negative effect on
Gabrielle’s access to education, they were not convinced that the school district’s response
to known harassment was clearly unreasonable.”263 Examining the school district’s
response to the alleged conduct, the court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the
school district’s actions were not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not equate to
deliberate indifference.264
The record revealed that the school district’s response to known incidents of Jason’s
inappropriate conduct was not clearly unreasonable.265 Jason was disciplined after each
reported or observed instance, and steps were taken to prevent future inappropriate
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conduct.266 Gabrielle, however, claimed that the actions taken by the school were
insufficient to protect her from further unwanted contact with Jason during lunch and
recess.267 Gabrielle argued that in order for the school not to act with deliberate
indifference, the school district must have effectively ended all interaction between the two
students to prevent conclusively any further harassment.268 The court reiterated that Davis
does not require funding recipients to remedy peer harassment. All that Davis requires is to
show that the school had not acted clearly unreasonably in response to known instances of
harassment. Each disciplinary action and intervention the school district took in response to
Jason’s conduct, most notably the decisions to move him to another class and eventually to
grant Gabrielle’s request for a school transfer, were not clearly unreasonable as a matter of
law.269
The court concluded, “Taking into account the ages of the children involved, their
apparent lack of knowledge of the nature of their actions, and the lack of impact on
Gabrielle’s ability to attend and perform at school, the court found that the alleged
harassment was not so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied Gabrielle
access to educational opportunities.”270 Even if it was, the school district’s response was
not so clearly unreasonable as to render it liable under Title IX.271 The judgment of the
district court therefore was affirmed.
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Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board272
In the same year, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit would
decide a similar case, Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board. The facts are as follows:
Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II were second-grade students in Barbara Cyphers’s class at North
Toledo Blade Elementary School at the start of the 1998-99 school year.273 Jane Doe III
joined the class in January 1999. During that year, William T. Coulson was the principal of
North Toledo.
John Doe, the alleged harasser, apparently was expelled from a private school for
striking a female student.274 At this point, he was enrolled by his parents at Toledo Blade.
He was placed in Cyphers’s class in November 1998. As soon as he joined the class, John
Doe allegedly began a pattern of harassing conduct toward the girls.275
It was alleged that not long after he joined the class, John Doe would cross his
hands, gesture to his genitals, and tell the three girls to “suck it.”276 In the lunchroom, he
would hold two fingers up to the girls, which apparently meant “meet me in bed in two
seconds.”277 He also made comments that he wanted to “suck the girls’ breasts till the milk
came out,” that he wanted the girls to “suck the juice from his penis,” and that “he wanted
the girls to have sex with him.”278 On the playground, John would chase the girls and try to
touch them on their chests and to kiss them.279 He also would try to grab Jane Doe III and

272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279

Hawkins v. Sarasota County School Board, 322 F.3d 1279.
Id.
Id. at 1281.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1282.
Id.

63
look up her skirt while at the bus stop. He would also jump onto her and rub his body on
hers.280 The girls claimed that this conduct took place over a period of several months.281
Although none of the girls’ grades appeared to suffer, two of them said that on four or five
occasions they faked being sick in order not to go to school.282 Their parents testified that
they cried more frequently, appeared anxious, and were reluctant to go to school.283
School personnel admitted that they had received complaints about John Doe, but
none of the staff stated that they saw him engage in behavior that was sexual.284 Cyphers
testified that she received complaints that he was being “annoying” to the other children,
tapping his pencil, and distracting them from doing their work.285 Cyphers testified that
“some time near the end of the school year, three girls, Jane Doe II and two girls not
involved with this suit, told me that John Doe was being ‘disgusting.’”286 Cyphers stated
that “John Doe had been saying ‘I love you’ and ‘will you marry me’ to the girls,” and she
referred to the conduct as “natural things in second grade.”287 She also stated that “it was
not until she had spoken with Jane Doe III’s mother that [she] had been informed of any of
the explicit things John Doe had said or done.”288
The three girls testified that they had consistently described John Doe’s behavior to
Cyphers and were ignored by Cyphers. Jane Doe I stated that she “told Cyphers that John
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Doe was being ‘nasty’ not long after he first exhibited harassing behavior.”289 Jane Doe II
stated that, “Early in the year, I told Cyphers that John Doe was being ‘disgusting’ and
asked to have my seat moved.”290
Jane Doe III testified that one day after she arrived at Toledo Blade she informed
Cyphers that John Doe had been following her. She also alleged that during recess that day
she had told Cyphers that John Doe was being gross, referring to him touching her groin.291
She also alleged that she told Cyphers that John Doe had told her to “suck his dick” on a
separate occasion, to which she was told to sit down.292
Jane Doe III’s mother contacted both Coulson and Cyphers, and in this
conversation, Cyphers told her that the school was aware of John Doe’s behavior and that
they were working with John Doe’s parents to try to resolve the issues.293 Upon learning of
the harassment of Jane by John, Coulson contacted John Zoretich, director of Sarasota
County Elementary Schools, and was told to “follow through” on the allegations.294 For the
harassment, John Doe was suspended for a week and, upon his return, had a week of “inschool” suspension, for which he sat at a desk in the office and had escorts take him to the
lunchroom and bus at the end of the day.295
In June 1999, Coulson received notification from an attorney representing the three
girls’ families that the school had not rectified John Doe’s conduct and they had filed suit
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with the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida for violating the girls’ rights
under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school board
ruling that the complaints of Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II were too general to provide notice
of the sexual nature of John Doe’s harassment.296 On the other hand, the court did believe
Jane Doe III, accepting the testimony as truth, in that she expressly and repeatedly told her
classroom teacher about the specifics of the behavior; the district judge believed that notice
to the teacher constituted actual knowledge on the part of the school board.297 Confirming
that actual notice was present, the court found that the teacher and other school personnel
were not deliberately indifferent to the harassment and that the girls were not deprived of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.298 In arriving at
his decision concerning notice, the district judge relied upon language from the Tenth
Circuit Court’s opinion in Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado.299 The parents
appealed the district court’s decision.
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The Eleventh Circuit Court began its review by exploring the issue of whether
notice to a teacher constitutes actual knowledge on the part of a school board. To find an
answer to the question, the court examined how Florida organizes its public schools, the
authority and responsibility granted by state law to administrators and teachers, the school
district’s discrimination policies and procedures, and the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.300 In its examination, the court stated that in the context of student-peer
harassment, delineation of the notice requirement may prove to be difficult.301 However,
when it comes to harassment by teachers or staff, the Supreme Court’s requirement of
actual notice is limited to an easily identifiable number of school administrators.302 The
court then acknowledged that a much broader number of administrators and employees
could conceivably exercise at least some control over student behavior.303
The court stated:
These issues were not fully briefed or argued on appeal. The notice issue
was raised only in a footnote in appellee’s brief, and appellants did not
respond to it in their reply. It would be helpful to have the issues fully
presented in an adversarial setting. This is particularly true where there is
little guidance from Congress, the Supreme Court, or the other Courts of
Appeal. It is always difficult to determine Congress’ intent when dealing
with the elements of an implied cause of action because the text and
legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create a cause of action
is typically silent as to the parameters of the action. In Davis, the Supreme
Court majority did not directly address who must have notice even in the
face of Justice Kennedy’s dissent, and there is scant persuasive authority
from the other circuits.304
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The court also determined that the deliberate indifference issue was intertwined with
whether or not actual notice was given and, if actual notice was given, whether the school’s
actions were clearly unreasonable.305 The court decided that the better course is to not
answer the notice and deliberate-indifference issues involved in the first question and to rest
its opinion on the denial of access issue.306
The court also tried to determine if the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it deprived the victims of access to the educational
opportunities of the school.307 In this case, the conduct was frequent and persistent and
took place over several months.308 The harassment ranged from sexually explicit and
vulgar language to acts of offensive touching, and even though the children involved did
not fully understand its ramifications, the harassment was unwelcome and intimidating.309
The court stated that even if the behavior was assumed to be severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive, it was not so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
denied the girls equal access to education.310 As the Supreme Court stated, the most
obvious example of student-on-student harassment that could deny a victim access to
education would involve a physical denial of access to school resources.311 The behavior
must also be severe enough to have a “systemic” effect of denying the victim equal access
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to an educational program or activity.312 The court took this to mean that discrimination
must be more widespread than a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment and that the
effects of the harassment touch the whole or entirety of an educational program or
activity.313
The court determined that there was no evidence of a concrete, negative effect on
the victim’s ability to receive an education or access to educational programs or
opportunities.314 In fact, the girls testified that they were merely upset about the
harassment. Two of the girls said that they faked being sick four or five times in order not
to go to school, which does not establish a systemic effect of denying access to an
educational program or activity.315 In this case, the harassment was not so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it systemically deprived the victims of access to
the educational opportunities of the school. The judgment of the district court was
affirmed.

Porto v. Town of Tewksbury316
The First Circuit Court of Appeals was the next circuit court to utilize the Davis
three-prong test, in Porto v. Town of Tewksbury in 2006. The facts of the case are: SC
entered the Tewksbury public schools when he was eight years old. Even though he was
considered to have special needs by the Massachusetts Department of Education, he was
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initially placed in a standard first-grade class. SC’s teacher eventually had SC placed in
special-education classes.
SC met another boy, RC, in his first-grade special-education class. Between first
and fifth grade, SC reported to Ann Marie Porto, the foster mother, a number of sexual
types of incidents with RC.317 Porto alleged that she reported these incidents to teachers
and administrators.318 In 1999, SC was demonstrating inappropriate sexual behavior at
home, which prompted the Portos to take him to a psychologist.319 After speaking with the
psychologist, it was learned that SC and RC had been engaging in oral sex on the school
bus for about a year.320 The Portos reported this to the school administrators and to the
Massachusetts Department of Social Services.321 As a result, SC and RC were put on
different buses. Teachers and school aides were also directed to keep SC and RC separated
at all times.322
In 2000, the next school year, school officials confirmed that there were three
incidents in October 2000 that involved inappropriate touching between RC and SC.323
The incidents occurred in the life-skills classroom, which included RC touching SC’s leg
twice when they were sitting next to each other.324 When the third incident occurred, the
two boys were sent to the guidance counselor. The guidance counselor told the boys that
this type of behavior was inappropriate, and then the boys apologized and told him that they

317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324

Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

70
would not do it again.325 In testimony, the counselor explained that he thought the boys
understood the discussion. The counselor also reiterated to the teachers and aides that they
must monitor them and keep them separated.326 No additional incidents were reported to
the school until January.
On the morning of January 11, 2001, RC was excused to go to the bathroom, and a
short time later, SC asked Edelstein, the teacher, if he could get a book from his locker. 327
Two or three minutes had passed when Edelstein realized that neither of the boys had
returned, so she stepped out into the hall to find them but did not see where they were.328
When looking in the hall, Edelstein saw Robert Ware, the behavior management facilitator
at Wynn Middle School, and asked him to go into the bathroom to investigate.329 Upon
entering the bathroom, he saw SC and RC in a stall, pulling their pants up.330 At this point,
he took both students to his office and asked them what they had been doing, and SC told
Ware that he had sexual intercourse with RC and that they had been touching each other on
a weekly basis for some time.331 At this time, Ware informed James McGuire, the
principal, about the incident, who then called SC’s parents, told them what had happened,
and asked them to pick up SC from school.332
SC did not return to school after this incident, and he remained at home and
received 10 hours of tutoring per week. The Portos filed suit against the school in the U.S.
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District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging it was deliberately indifferent to
RC’s sexual harassment of SC, violating Title IX. The case proceeded to a jury trial. After
one day of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Portos, awarding
$250,000 in compensatory damages and $1 in punitive damages.333 Tewksbury appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.334
For the purposes of the appeal, the court assumed that SC was subject to severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment by RC and that Tewksbury was a funding
recipient who had actual knowledge in 2001 of at least some prior incidents of
inappropriate sexual behavior.335 It was also assumed that the harassment deprived SC of
educational opportunities or benefits.336 Even with these assumptions, the court did not
think that the Portos presented sufficient evidence that a rational jury could have concluded
that Tewksbury was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.337
The problem, stated the court, with the Portos’ argument was that they suggested
that Tewksbury should have done more to prevent RC from sexually harassing SC.338
Claiming that a school district could or should have done more is insufficient to establish
deliberate indifference under Title IX. “Funding recipients are deemed deliberately
indifferent to acts of student-on-student harassment only where the recipient’s response to
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the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.”339
The Portos did not claim that Tewksbury did nothing to address RC’s sexual
harassment of SC.340 They acknowledged that Tewksbury separated SC and RC after each
episode of sexual harassment and later had the school guidance counselor intervene.341 The
Portos claimed that these interventions were ineffective. The court concluded that there is
no doubt that the bathroom incident was evidence that RC’s inappropriate sexual behavior
was not stopped.342 However, the fact that the interventions designed to stop harassment
were ultimately ineffective did not establish that the steps taken by the school were clearly
unreasonable in light of the circumstances.343 The test for whether a school should be liable
under Title IX for student-on-student harassment is not one of effectiveness by hindsight,
claimed the court.344 Therefore, this is not a case in which a school “continued to use the
same ineffective methods to no acknowledged avail.”345 In fact, it appeared that
Tewksbury’s methods were working up until the bathroom incident.346 The court ruled that
the evidence shows that after the counselor’s intervention, the school believed that it had
been successful in stopping RC’s inappropriate behavior.347 Because continued sexual
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harassment was not a “known or obvious consequence” of the school’s inaction, as in
Vance, Tewksbury cannot have been deliberately indifferent to SC’s plight.348
The court found that Tewksbury acted reasonably in responding to RC’s
inappropriate touching by separating RC and SC and sending them to the guidance
counselor.349 For these reasons, the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court
and remanded with instructions to the district court to enter judgment in favor of
Tewksbury.

Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee350
One year later, in 2007, the First Circuit Court was again asked to apply the Davis
test to another student-on-student sexual harassment case. The harassment started on
February 14, 2001. Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, informed her parents,
Lisa Ryan and Robert Fitzgerald, that each time she wore a dress to school, an older student
on her school bus would bully her into lifting her skirt.351 Lisa Ryan Fitzgerald believed
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that these incidents were the reasons that Jacqueline’s behavior changed.352 She
immediately called the principal, Frederick Scully, to report the incident.
The school had a prevention specialist on staff, Lynda Day, whose responsibilities
included responding to reports of inappropriate student behavior and issuing discipline as
necessary. School officials had a hard time identifying the alleged perpetrator from
Jacqueline’s story, so they arranged for her to observe students exiting the school bus. This
took place over the next two days.353 Finally, Jacqueline identified the perpetrator as Briton
Oleson, a third grader. That same day, Scully and Day questioned Briton, who denied the
allegations. Day also interviewed the bus driver and most of the students who regularly
rode the bus. The interviews did not yield anyone who was unable to corroborate
Jacqueline’s version of the relevant events.354
Shortly after the initial investigation, the Fitzgeralds told Scully that Jacqueline had
remembered additional details about her ordeal. She recalled that in addition to persuading
her to lift her dress, Briton had bullied her into pulling down her underpants and spreading
her legs.355 A meeting was immediately held with the Fitzgeralds in order to discuss this
new information. The principal, Scully, also interviewed Briton again and followed up on
some of the interviews that Day had conducted.
Concurrent with the school’s investigation, the local police department had
launched an investigation as well. The police department found Briton credible and
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decided ultimately that there was insufficient evidence to proceed criminally against him.356
Relying in part on this decision and in part on the results of the school’s own investigation,
Scully reached a similar conclusion as to disciplinary measures.357
While the investigations were taking place, the Fitzgeralds had been driving
Jacqueline to and from school. The school offered to place her on a different bus or to
leave rows of empty seats between the kindergarten students and the older students on the
original bus. The Fitzgeralds rejected these suggestions. The Fitzgeralds were angered by
the school’s primary suggestion of switching buses. They believed the school was
punishing Jacqueline rather than Briton, who would continue to ride the original bus. The
Fitzgeralds offered a number of other alternatives, such as placing a monitor on the bus or
transferring Briton to a different bus. The superintendent of the school system, Russell
Dever, declined these suggestions.
Even with her parents taking her to school, Jacqueline claimed that she had several
disturbing interactions with Briton as the school year progressed.358 Some were casual
encounters in the hallways, but one occurred during a mixed-grade gym class. In this
encounter, the gym teacher randomly required Jacqueline to give Briton a “high five.”359
Each incident was acknowledged by Scully as soon as it was reported, and there was
no claim that Scully failed to address these incidents. The result was that Jacqueline
stopped participating in gym class and began to miss school with increasing frequency.360
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In April 2002, the Fitzgeralds sued the school district in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts. Their complaint claimed that the school district was in
violation of their daughter’s rights under Title IX for being deliberately indifferent to the
student-on-student sexual harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to the
school. The parents appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The First Circuit Court began its analysis by exploring the deliberate-indifference
prong of the Davis test. The court stated that Title IX did not make an educational
institution the insurer either of a student’s safety or of a parent’s peace of mind.361 Using
the language in Davis, the court held that deliberate indifference requires more than a
showing that the institution’s response to harassment was less than ideal; it must show that
the institution’s response was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.”362
Looking at the case at hand, the court explained that there were three basic points
that were not in dispute. First, it was understood that the school district was a recipient of
federal funds and, therefore, legally bound to comply with the rules of Title IX.363 Second,
everyone agreed that the school had actual knowledge of the school-bus harassment on
February 14, 2001.364 Third, it could not be denied that, if true, Jacqueline’s allegation that
she was forced to pull up her skirt, drop her underpants, and spread her legs constituted
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment.365 What was left to determine was
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whether the school acted with deliberate indifference to the known harassment. The court
turned to the facts of the case to make this determination.
The Fitzgeralds themselves admitted that Scully met with them on the very morning
that they notified the school of Jacqueline’s plight.366 They also admitted that Scully
immediately launched an investigation.367 This investigation consisted of multiple
interviews with Jacqueline and Briton, an interview of the bus driver, and individual
interviews of between 35 and 50 other students on the bus.368 The school also cooperated
fully in an investigation undertaken by the local police.369 The results of that investigation
were taken into account in considering disciplinary options. Within two weeks after the
initial report of harassment, the school offered to change Jacqueline’s bus so she would not
have to interact with Briton.370
These actions may not have constituted an ideal response to the complaint of
harassment. In hindsight, stated the court, there may have been other and better avenues
that the school district could have explored or other and better questions that could have
been asked during the interviews.371 But Title IX does not require educational institutions
to take heroic measures, to perform flawless investigations, to craft perfect solutions, or to
adopt strategies advocated by parents.372 The test, claimed the court, was objective,
whether the institution’s response, evaluated in light of the known circumstances, was so
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deficient as to be clearly unreasonable.373 The court stated that the response by school
officials in the case could not be reasonably characterized in that manner.374 The court
concluded that due to the facts and the law, no rational fact-finder could supportably
conclude that the school district acted with deliberate indifference in this case.375 It found
that the district court appropriately granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district on the Title IX claim.

Doe v. East Haven Board of Education376
During the 2001-02 academic year, Doe was a 14-year-old freshman at East Haven
High School. On or about January 1, 2002, Doe was sexually assaulted by two East Haven
High School seniors, Jonathan Toro and Robert Demars.377 Doe did not report what had
happened until March 25, 2002, when rumors surfaced at East Haven High School that two
seniors had slept with a freshman girl.378 Doe then gave a statement to East Haven High
School administrators and the East Haven Police Department that she had been raped by
Toro and Demars.379 Doe claimed that immediately after she disclosed the details of her
sexual assault, she began to suffer sexual harassment at school by many students, including
some of her former friends, as well as the friends and girlfriends of Toro and Demars.380
This harassment was mostly verbal, though in one instance, a student threw a tennis ball at
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Doe’s head. In another, a male student barked like a dog at Doe as she walked down a
school hallway to her locker. Doe began not to attend certain classes in an attempt to avoid
the harassment; instead, she would sit in the guidance office during those periods and
complete her classwork independently.381
Toro and Demars continued to attend East Haven High after the incident and after
their subsequent arrest on charges of sexual assault.382 Eventually, they were given
homebound instruction, beginning in May 2002. In March 2003, Toro and Demars pled
guilty to charges of sexual assault in the third degree.383 Doe filed suit against the school
district for violating Title IX on May 6, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut. The district court ruled in favor of Doe. The school district appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that a
reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that, when the 14-year-old girl reported the
rape and then was persistently subjected by other students to verbal abuse reflecting sexbased stereotypes and questions regarding the veracity of her story, the harassment would
not have occurred but for the girl’s sex.384 Further, a reasonable fact-finder could have
concluded that school officials actually knew of the sexual harassment. Moreover, a
reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that the girl was subjected to a disparately
hostile educational environment that deprived her of educational benefits and
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opportunities.385 Finally, a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that school
authorities acted in an unreasonable fashion by waiting five weeks to take concrete action to
stop the harassment.386

Rost v. Steamboat Springs387
Rost v. Steamboat Springs was the next student-on-student sexual harassment case
decided by a court of appeals, taking place in the Tenth Circuit Court in 2008. The facts
were in 2000, K.C. was enrolled in Steamboat Springs Middle School as a seventh-grader
who received special-education services. Allegedly, at the beginning of her seventh grade
and continuing into eighth grade, K.C. was coerced into performing various sexual acts
with a number of boys.388 Apparently, the boys pestered her continuously for oral sex,
called her “retard” and stupid, threatened to spread rumors that she frequently engaged in
sexual conduct with others, and threatened to distribute naked photographs of her.389 The
police report documented that the incidents occurred in a variety of private locations and
social settings, and a few of the incidents appeared to be “consensual.”390
Ms. Rost, K.C.’s mother, became aware of the sexual harassment when K.C.
reported the incidents to school officials on January 16, 2003.391 However, Ms. Rost
claimed that she asked school officials to talk to K.C. during the spring and fall of 2002
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because she thought something was wrong.392 Her concerns started in the spring of 2002
because K.C. did not want to go to school anymore. Her mother asked the school
counselor, Margie Briggs-Casson, to find out what was bothering K.C.393 Tim Bishop,
principal of the middle school, was also notified at this time by Ms. Rost about K.C. and
what she perceived as Ms. Briggs-Casson’s lack of responsiveness.394 She also informed
the principal that the same boys tried to break into her house to find pain medication. Ms.
Briggs-Casson eventually met with K.C.. During this meeting, K.C. told her about the
harassment, saying that “these boys were bothering me.”395 Due to her special needs, K.C.
did not know how to use the word “assault,” and she did not use specific details when
discussing the incidents.396
In 2001, during K.C.’s freshman year at Steamboat Springs High School, she
continued to experience the harassment. Ms. Rost allegedly reported the harassment to the
principal, telling him that K.C. said “the boys were bothering her and calling her retarded,
she hated school and was afraid to go to school, she was afraid to go to her math class that
she had with one of the boys, and she was being teased for having an aide.”397 The
principal and Ms. Rost met several times, and the outcome of these meetings resulted in an
aide being assigned to sit in the back of the math class instead of being next to K.C.398 At
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this point no one knew of the sexual harassment. Ms. Rost and the principal thought she
was experiencing general name-calling.399
Shortly thereafter, K.C. told Ann Boler, the high school counselor, that one of the
boys repeatedly called her to ask for oral sex.400 She also said that two of the boys bullied
her into sexual behavior by threatening to show others naked pictures of her if she didn’t.401
Upon learning of this incident, Ms. Boler immediately contacted Officer Jason Patrick, the
school resource officer, because she could not find the principal or vice principal.402 When
Principal Schmidt was finally found, a call was made, with Officer Patrick, about K.C.’s
statement.403
After talking with K.C., it was determined that none of the incidents took place on
school grounds; in fact, the incidents happened before any of the students were enrolled in
high school.404 With this information, the school district did not investigate the assaults.405
Principal Schmidt stayed in contact with Officer Patrick, who was investigating the sexual
assault for the police department. The school assisted him by pulling students together for
interviews during the investigation.406
The investigation was not effective because Ms. Rost refused to communicate with
the school or law enforcement regarding the incident on the advice of counsel.407 The
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district attorney did not pursue the case based on Officer Patrick’s report. The district
attorney believed that it would be difficult to prove that the activity was not consensual and
the trial would expose K.C. to tremendous trauma.408
A couple of weeks after K.C. reported the incident, she suffered an acute psychotic
episode that required hospitalization.409 In an effort to transition K.C. back to school, Ms.
Rost met with school officials before K.C. was discharged to discuss educational
alternatives for her daughter.410 Ms. Rost was accepting of having a private tutor for her
daughter but refused any option that had K.C. returning to the high school.411 Mediation
took place between the school and Ms. Rost the following year, and the final outcome was
that K.C. attended a school other than Steamboat Springs High School.412
Ms. Rost filed suit against the school district in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado alleging violations under Title IX. The district court granted summary
judgment for the district on the federal claims. The Rosts appealed the district court’s
ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
On review, the appeals court first reviewed the actual notice-standard of the Davis
test. Regarding the facts of the case, K.C. testified that she told Margie Briggs-Casson in
the spring of 2002 about the assaults.413 She also stated that she did not know to use the
word “assault.”414 When asked what she told Ms. Briggs-Casson, K.C. stated that “these
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boys were bothering me and no one understood me in town.” K.C.’s statement that the
boys were bothering her was insufficient to give the district notice that she was being
sexually harassed.415 Ms. Rost argued that the “district court mischaracterized the
testimony and failed to consider ambiguities in the light most favorable to her,” but the
Tenth Circuit Court determined that there was no reading of the testimony that would
establish that the school district had actual notice of the harassment based on K.C.’s lack of
details.416
Ms. Rost also claimed that the district received actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment in the fall of 2002. She explained that she had met with Principal Schmidt early
in the fall of 2002 to discuss the following concerns: K.C. was afraid to attend her math
class; K.C. did not want an aide in the math class anymore; and K.C. said that the boys
were bothering her.417 Ms. Rost was not more specific in her report because K.C was
unable to communicate her concerns to her more specifically.418 As a result of these
meetings, an aide was assigned to sit in the back of the class to monitor the behavior.419 No
one, at that time, knew that K.C. was being sexually harassed.420 The Tenth Circuit Court
determined that the school did not receive actual notice of any sexual harassment during
those meetings in the fall of 2002.421
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The court then analyzed the deliberate-indifference standard of the Davis test.
According to the facts of the case, it was undisputed that K.C. told Ms. Boler about the
sexual harassment on January 16, 2003, and therefore, this meeting gave the district actual
notice of the harassment.422 The next question the court needed to answer was whether the
school district was “deliberately indifferent to acts of harassment of which it had actual
knowledge.”423 The court did not respond to Ms. Rost’s complaint that the district had been
deliberately indifferent to the harassment because they concluded that the district had no
knowledge of the harassment until January 2003.424 Ms. Rost also claimed in her appeal
that the district’s response to the notice of the harassment was clearly unreasonable because
the district did not investigate the incidents, and neither did they interview the alleged
harassers and K.C or appropriately discipline the boys involved.425 She argued that the
school’s deliberate indifference deprived her daughter of an equal educational opportunity
after January 2003. She supported this claim with K.C.’s doctor’s visit in which she and
K.C. were advised not to return to Steamboat Springs High School due to the trauma K.C.
had endured.426
In its analysis, the court determined that when K.C. had told Ms. Boler about the
harassment, Ms. Boler immediately contacted Officer Patrick, the school resource officer,
who immediately questioned K.C. about the harassment.427 When Principal Schmidt had
learned of the incident, he determined that because none of the incidents took place at
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school and the incidents occurred before any of the students were students at the high
school, it would be more appropriate for Officer Patrick to investigate the sexual assaults.428
Officer Patrick worked with the school to arrange for the interviews of the students to find
out what had happened.429 In fact, there were approximately 50 conversations between the
two regarding the investigation, and in the end, the school received a copy of Officer
Patrick’s report. The court did not think that it should be held against the district for letting
Officer Patrick take the lead in this situation.430 Officer Patrick and the school believed that
the harassment happened off school grounds and criminal charges were a possibility.431 As
a result, the court held that the district’s response was not clearly unreasonable. The school
officials immediately contacted law enforcement officials, cooperated fully in the
investigation, and were kept informed of the investigation.432 The district reasonably
believed it did not have control over the incidents, and just because the principal thought
that the school might be able to discipline students for conduct off school grounds did not
reveal anything about whether it was appropriate, given the seriousness of the situation.433
In this case, the school district relied on the fact that it could not determine which
conduct was not consensual because there were other admitted consensual acts in the police
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report.434 The court ruled that this conclusion was not clearly unreasonable, and therefore,
the school district would not be deliberately indifferent in making a judgment that it would
be difficult to sort out conflicting facts, especially when the victim had not provided
descriptive details to school officials.435
Finally, just because the school did not punish the boys involved did not equate to a
“clearly unreasonable” act.436 Ms. Rost wanted the district to expel the four boys so that
her daughter could go back to the school.437 Relying on the Supreme Court decision in
Davis, the court noted that schools do not need to expel every student accused of sexual
harassment to protect them from liability and “victims of peer harassment do not have a
Title IX right to make particular remedial demands.”438 Under this standard, schools are
not responsible for stopping the harassment; they “must merely respond to known peer
harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”439
Many factors in the case supported the school’s decision not to discipline the boys;
for this reason, the district’s decision not to pursue discipline was not clearly unreasonable
or deliberately indifferent.440 Discipline was not issued because Principal Schmidt
determined that most of the incidents did not take place in school and the district did not
believe that it had responsibility or control over the incidents.441 It was also determined by
the district attorney that it would be difficult to prove that the conduct was not
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consensual.442 To make matters worse, Officer Patrick’s and Principal Schmidt’s
investigation was halted because Ms. Rost and K.C. refused to communicate with them on
the advice of counsel.443 For these reasons, it would be difficult to discipline students when
the facts were so unclear as to which conduct was consensual, given that the victim did not
clarify details of the incidents.444
The court finally determined that the district’s response was not so clearly
unreasonable so as to be deliberately indifferent to the harassment. For all these reasons,
the court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate on the Title IX claim.

Phassen v. Merrill Community School District445
Phassen v. Merrill Community School District was heard by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in 2008. The facts were: during the fall of 2007, Jane Doe was a student at
Merrill Middle School and John Doe was a student at Merrill High School. The two
schools were housed in the same building but in different wings of the building. At the
beginning of the 2007-2008 school year, John was a ninth-grade special-education student
and Jane was in eighth grade.446
Phassen claimed that John sexually harassed Jane three times during the beginning
of the school year.447 First, John shoved Jane into a locker because she was talking to
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another boy and he “got jealous.”448 Second, John told Jane that “if she wanted to hang out
with him anymore, she would have to perform oral sex on him.”449 Finally, John made
“obscene sexual gestures” toward Jane during a school basketball game in which she was
playing, and these gestures were witnessed by the crowd.450
Mr. Phassen contacted the school after the basketball game to inform them about the
game’s events and John’s request for oral sex.451 He also told the school that he had spoken
with Jane about John’s gestures during the basketball game and that “she just replied that he
was a teenage boy and that Mr. Phassen wouldn’t understand.”452 At this point, Mr.
Phassen made the statement, “I believe John is a volcano waiting to erupt, and when he
does, someone will be hurt, student or staff.”453
Merrill convened an IEP team to create a plan to supervise John during school for
the next 30 days.454 The team would reconvene after 30 days to review the plan and discuss
possible adjustments if needed. During this time, John did not commit any acts of sexual
harassment.455
On December 20, 2007, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds shortly
after school had ended.456 On January 16, 2008, Merrill Superintendent John Searles
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recommended John’s expulsion because of the sexual assault, and the expulsion was
approved by the school board on January 30, 2008.457
On April 10, 2008, Jane’s family filed suit against Merrill and Merrill
administrators, alleging violations of Title IX. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan at Bay City granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Phassen appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit Court supported strongly the district court’s finding that the
school district did not violate Title IX. The court conceded that the sexual harassment
definitely took place; however, Phassen could not prove that Merrill’s response to the
sexual harassment was “deliberately indifferent.”458 Even taking into consideration all of
John Doe’s incidents of misbehavior and his frequency to engage in sexual harassment,
Phassen could not show that Merrill’s responses were deliberately indifferent.459 In fact,
Phassen conceded that Merrill’s response to the rape was not deliberately indifferent.460
Although John Doe appeared to engage in more serious misconduct outside of Merrill, the
court ruled that Merrill had authority only to discipline John for the locker incident, the
comments regarding a sexual act, and the sexual gestures at the basketball game.461 Merrill
went as far as to create a supervision plan for John, which resulted in no further incident
while it was in place.462 The Sixth Circuit Court upheld the district court’s decision based
upon these facts.
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Patterson v. Hudson Area Schools463
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit Court again decided a case of student-on-student sexual
harassment. In 2002, during DP’s sixth-grade year, a number of his peers began to tease
him, call him names, and push and shove him in the hallways.464 DP claimed that he
reported some of these instances to the school and was told that “kids will be kids; it’s
middle school.”465 Due to the harassment, DP began to receive psychological treatment
from Dr. Gretchen.466
The harassment that DP experienced in sixth grade became much worse in DP’s
seventh-grade year; he was called names such as “fat,” “faggot,” “gay,” “queer,” “pig,” and
“man boobs” on a daily basis.467 He was also pushed in the hallways and was called “Mr.
Clean,” a derogatory term that referred to DP’s lack of pubic hair.468
In one situation, DP attempted to stop a female classmate, BC, from harassing
another student and, in return, BC slapped DP.469 The band teacher, Crystal Bough, was the
first to learn about the incident, and it was alleged that she told DP that she “would take
care of it.”470 The Pattersons claimed that they were never contacted by the school and Ms.
Bough did not report the incident to the principal.471 Later in the same day, the geography
teacher, John Redding, asked DP, “How does it feel to be hit by a girl?”472
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A special education referral form was filled out by Tammy Cates, the social worker,
during the summer between DP’s seventh-grade and eighth-grade years for DP to be
evaluated for special-education services.473 The evaluation determined that DP was
emotionally impaired. An IEP team was convened, and an IEP was developed. DP was
placed in teacher Ted Adams’s resource room for one period of the day during his eighthgrade year.474 Mr. Adams was helpful in teaching DP how to cope with his peers, which
led to a successful eighth-grade year.475
Unfortunately for DP, his ninth-grade year was not as successful. This led to an
adjustment in the IEP by Hudson High School. DP was also not allowed to continue in Mr.
Adams resource room because Mr. Adams was a middle-school teacher and DP was in high
school. This decision was made by Hudson High School Principal Michael Osborne.476
Principal Osborne also “didn’t think that the high school resource room was the best place
for DP.”477 The Pattersons pleaded with Hudson to allow DP to continue in Mr. Adams’s
resource room because he had been so successful in eighth grade.
The beginning of his ninth-grade year was a repeat of the type of harassment DP
faced in sixth and seventh grades. DP’s peers called him “gay,” “fat,” “fag,” and “queer,”
and he was pushed and shoved in the hallways daily.478 It was also in ninth grade when DP
began to experience new types of harassment. During a presentation in front of his history
class, another student, SE, wrote a series of words that, when put together, said, “DP is
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fag.”479 This all happened in front of the entire class because he used the cards for his
presentation, and this made the students laugh at DP.480 Ms. Mansfield and the history
teacher found out that SE wrote the phrase, and SE was verbally reprimanded.481 Not long
after this incident, another student, JR, vandalized DP’s planner with the sexual phrases: “I
HEART penis,” “I lick it in the Ass,” “I HEART cock,” and “I’m a mamma’s boy/I suck on
her Nipple,” as well as drawings of buttocks and a penis.482 The student was reported to the
teacher and Principal Osborne, who issued JR a verbal reprimand, and the student did not
bother DP again after this.483
The final incident of harassment occurred in late May of 2005 at the end of a juniorvarsity baseball practice. DP alleged that he was sexually assaulted by a teammate, LP, in
the locker room.484 LP stripped naked, forced DP into a corner, jumped on DP’s shoulders,
and rubbed his penis and scrotum on DP’s neck and face.485 As this happened, another
student, NH, blocked the exit and prevented DP from leaving.486 As soon as he got home,
DP informed the Pattersons about the assault. He also told Andy Wade, who was his older
brother and coach of the junior-varsity baseball team.487 The family reported the assault to
Principal Osborne on Saturday during a baseball double-header.488
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The varsity baseball coach, Jeremy Beal, held a team meeting with both the juniorvarsity and the varsity baseball players after he learned about the incident. In this meeting,
the teams were told that they should “not joke around with guys who can’t take a man joke”
when DP was in the room.489
The harassment and sexual assault took a toll on DP, and he claimed that he had
been psychologically unable to enter the school since the end of his ninth-grade year.490
This claim prompted another modification to his IEP. For his 10th-grade year, DP received
instruction at Sacred Heart School, and the instruction was provided by Hudson. Sacred
Heart School was a Pre K-6 Catholic elementary school.491 His teachers would visit him at
Sacred Heart to discuss assignments. DP alleged that the visits were on occasion and that
the teachers would not respond to e-mails or phone calls made by him.492 Finally for his
11th- and 12th-grade years, Hudson allowed DP to take college placement courses at the
local college.493
The Pattersons filed suit against the school district in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan for violating DP’s rights under Title IX. The school moved
for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court applied the
three-part test expressed in Davis and articulated by that court in Vance.494 The district
court determined that the Pattersons had proved that the school had “actual notice” and the
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harassment was “severe and pervasive.”495 The Pattersons could not prove that Hudson’s
responses to DP’s attacks were “clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances.”496
The district court concluded that there was a failure to prove that the school’s response was
clearly unreasonable and that the Pattersons could not prove that the school was
“deliberately indifferent,” and it granted summary judgment.497 The parents appealed the
case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Because the district court had found that the Pattersons met their burden with regard
to Parts 1 and 2 of the test, the only issue on appeal was whether Hudson did or did not act
with deliberate indifference.498 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Pattersons, the Sixth Circuit Court determined that the Pattersons had demonstrated a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Hudson’s actions were deliberately
indifferent.499
The Sixth Circuit Court noted that one district court relied on language from Vance
and Davis,500 in the case Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 46, about a student
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who experienced four years of harassment from a number of students and a school district’s
“tactic of merely talking to and warning students who harassed plaintiff.” Occasional
investigation into “some of the more significant incidents and even eventually proactively
speaking to students and teachers in an effort to prevent further incidents raised a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to withstand summary judgment.”501 Theno is illustrative,
concluded the court.502
The school district in Theno argued that its response to the harassment could not be
seen as clearly unreasonable. The district court disagreed with the school, explaining that
this was a case that involved a few discrete incidents of harassment.503 The harassment was
severe and pervasive harassment and took place over four years. It also included multiple
students who engaged in the same form of harassment after those who were counseled had
stopped, and the school rarely took any disciplinary measures above and beyond a lecture
and warning to the harassers.504
The school did try different interventions in the later years, but the district court
determined that this was too little too late, that the harassment had been going on for a
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number of years without the school handing out any meaningful disciplinary measures to
deter other students from perpetuating the cycle of harassment.505 Schools are not legally
obligated to end harassment, but in this case, a reasonable jury could conclude that at some
point during the four-year period of harassment, the school district’s ineffective response to
the harassment became clearly unreasonable.506 The district court cited Vance to support
this determination. It also concluded that Vance supported a finding that “whether the
school’s belatedly stepped-up efforts were ‘too little, too late’ is a question for the jury.”507
When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Pattersons, the court
concluded that there were strong similarities between this case and Theno.508 In this case,
like Theno, the victim was repeatedly harassed over a number of years.509 Hudson’s
response to the harassment usually concluded with verbal reprimands to the harassing
students.510 In most of the cases, the reprimands stopped the harassment by the harassing
student, but it did not stop other students from harassing DP.511 The harassment was so
pervasive that it actually became criminal sexual assault in one incident. The school knew
that the reprimands were not preventing the overall harassment of DP.512 There was no
argument that DP continued to have problems with other students, even after some were
reprimanded or even disciplined, and DP reported those continuing problems to Hudson.513
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The school’s argument was that they had dealt successfully with each identified
perpetrator and, therefore, they could not be liable under Title IX as a matter of law.514
This argument missed the point, claimed the court. As explained earlier, “Hudson’s success
with individual students did not prevent the overall and continuing harassment of DP, a fact
of which Hudson was fully aware, and thus, Hudson’s isolated success with individual
perpetrators could not shield Hudson from liability as a matter of law.”515 It was for a jury
to decide whether Hudson’s actions were “clearly unreasonable.”516

Sanchez v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch School District517
Two years later, in 2011, the Fifth Circuit Court had its first opportunity to apply the
Davis standard in a student-on-student sexual harassment case. Sanchez was a student at
Creekview High School in the Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District
(ISD). She alleged that she had been sexually harassed by J.H, who was also a Creekview
senior and female cheerleader.518
Problems between the two girls started in March 2008, when J.H. was suspended
from cheerleading for one week for posting inappropriate Facebook photos.519 J.H. was
upset with Sanchez because she thought Sanchez’s mother, Liz Laningham, had given the
Facebook photos to Creekview administrators, so J.H. threatened to “get even” with
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Sanchez.520 As soon as Laningham found out about the threat, she notified Cyndi Boyd,
Creekview’s principal, about J.H.’s comments.521 Boyd had the assistant principal, Lisa
Leadabrand, to meet with J.H. and her mother to find out what happened.522
On the same day that Laningham emailed Boyd and Leadabrand about J.H.’s
threats, she also sent three additional emails alleging hazing and violations of Sanchez’s
rights.523
On March 26, J.H. found out that Sanchez was dating her ex-boyfriend, C.P., which
began during spring break.524 J.H. was upset and called Sanchez a “ho” and threatened to
beat her up.525 Laningham notified the administration about the threat, and the school
administration immediately investigated the incident.526 The investigation did not yield
enough evidence to discipline J.H., but, to be proactive, the school switched J.H. to a
different sixth-period class within five days.527
Laningham was also concerned that the older girls would sabotage her daughter in
the upcoming cheerleader tryouts.528 Laningham had her lawyer contact the superintendent,
Annette Griffin, to notify her of several incidents, such as Laningham’s belief that
Creekview favored J.H., K.O., and M.W. over Sanchez; problems with the booster club;
Laningham’s conflict with the administration over the end-of-year video; and other alleged
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wrongs.529 The school district responded by having its attorney write a letter stating that
“the District takes all such allegations seriously and, with advice and assistance from this
firm, intends in due course to fully and thoroughly review such matters and the requested
categories of relief.”530
Sanchez did not make the varsity cheerleading squad and this made her upset.
Laningham sent three emails to Boyd after the tryouts, complaining that J.H. sexually
harassed her daughter.531 She claimed: (1) that on April 11, J.H. had overheard Sanchez in
the locker room discussing a rash on Sanchez’s breast, then J.H. started a rumor that
Sanchez “had a hickey on her boob”;532 (2) that on April 15, J.H. “cornered” Sanchez in the
hallway during a passing period, “told her that she [J.H.] was having sex with C.P.,” and
“physically touched her by wiping the tears from Sanchez’s eyes”; and (3) that on April 22,
J.H. slapped C.P.’s buttock as she walked by Sanchez and C.P. and stated that “your ass is
so cute, and you and Sanchez are so cute!”533 Laningham made sure to point out in her
emails that the first incident occurred on “the last school day prior to tryout week,” the
second on “the second day of tryout week.”534
All these incidents were investigated by Boyd. In the investigation, it was
discovered that J.H. was not in the locker room when Sanchez discussed the mark on her
breast, and therefore, J.H. could not have overheard Sanchez.535 It was also discovered that
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Sanchez was the one who started the conversation about her rash in front of other girls.536
Regarding the hallway incident, J.H. did admit to talking to Sanchez in the hallway and
wiping away her tears. She claimed that she was trying to comfort Sanchez because her exboyfriend was “playing” both of them.537 Regarding the butt-slap incident, J.H. also
admitted to the butt-slap claim, but C.P. did not find the action objectionable, so no action
was taken.538
Sanchez was not satisfied with the school’s response, so she sued the district in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, claiming it had violated Title IX
because it had been deliberately indifferent to her alleged harassment. The magistrate judge
granted the district summary judgment on only the harassment claims under Title IX.
Sanchez appealed the summary judgment ruling.539
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX. However, the actions must be based on sex,
according to the words of Title IX, and “not merely tinged with offensive sexual
connotations.”540 J.H. called Sanchez a “ho” once, and the comment was not even made
directly to her.541 The court held that this behavior was not comparable to the harassment
experienced in Davis and it by no means qualified as harassment at all.542
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The court also concluded that the rest of J.H.’s behavior was not based on Sanchez’s
sex.543 J.H. was mad at Sanchez because she was dating her ex-boyfriend, and she was mad
because she thought the mother turned her in for the Facebook photos.544 J.H.’s behavior
appeared to be motivated out of personal hatred for Sanchez and not based on sex.545 J.H.’s
conduct was more like teasing or bullying than it was sexual harassment.546 Because
harassment “on the basis of sex is the crux of a Title IX sexual harassment case and a
failure to plead that element is crucial,” the Fifth Circuit Court held that the district was
entitled to summary judgment on the Title IX claim.547
As can be seen by the previously reviewed federal appellate court cases, each court
has to take many facts into consideration when determining the liability of a school for
student-on-student harassment. A further analysis of how the courts have interpreted the
facts is presented in Chapter 3 of this study. However, as stated earlier in the chapter, the
next section focuses on only a few district court cases that address gender nonconformity
and Title IX. It should be noted that there are a number of district court cases that have
been decided and reviewed.548 These cases were not utilized in this study because these
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courts must turn to their circuit court of appeals for binding guidance. This was the purpose
of focusing on court of appeals cases.

Relevant District Court Cases

Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709
First, in 2000, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota heard Jesse
Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709.549 Jesse Montgomery attended the
ISD in Duluth, Minnesota, from kindergarten through 10th grade. Jesse claimed that when
he attended ISD he was subject to frequent verbal and physical harassment, beginning in
kindergarten and continuing into high school, when it happened daily. ISD did not dispute
the fact that he was harassed. Some of the verbal harassment directed at Jesse was based
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upon what others perceived his sexual orientation to be. Taunts included “faggot,” “fag,”
“gay boy,” “lesbian,” “femme boy,” and “bitch.”550
According to Jesse, as he moved from middle school to high school, the verbal
taunts started to become physical threats. He claimed that several students punched him,
kicked him, and knocked him down on the playground.551 He also claimed that students
pushed him down in the hallway, unzipped his backpack, and threw objects at him. When
he told school officials about the harassment, the students were issued verbal reprimands.
On some occasions, the threats and assaults that Jesse experienced were more sexual in
nature. One student in middle school grabbed his legs, inner thighs, chest, and crotch.552
This student also grabbed his buttocks on several occasions. The same student asked Jesse
if he could see him naked after gym class. This same kind of harassment continued in high
school. In choir, Jesse claimed that students in his class put their arms around him and
grabbed his inner thigh and buttocks, taunting him about being gay. One student went so
far as to grab his own genitalia while squeezing Jesse’s buttocks. He would even stand
behind Jesse and grind his penis into Jesse’s backside. This same student pretended to rape
Jesse anally. All of this took place in front of other students who laughed as they watched.
Teachers did not see this take place, but Jesse did tell teachers about the incidents. The
teachers’ responses to the harassment varied. They either gave a verbal reprimand, or they
sent the offending student to the principal’s office.553
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Jesse stated that, over the years, he reported the harassment to school administrators,
teachers, and other staff. When he was in middle school, his parents reported the
harassment to the superintendent on several occasions. One way in which school officials
responded to the complaints was to have Jesse visit school counselors and attend group
sessions with other boys to talk about how to handle harassment.554 Discipline was applied
to the offending students, but most of the discipline was no more than a verbal reprimand.
On only one occasion did students who harassed Jesse receive discipline that was
more severe than merely verbal. In this particular incident, because of Jesse’s repeated
complaints, the school principal referred his parents and him to the school-district human
resource director to determine if he had been sexually harassed. The human resource
director conducted an investigation and ruled that two fellow classmates had sexually
harassed him. One of the students was issued a five-day out-of-school suspension, and the
other received a one-day out-of-school suspension. The school district also suspended both
students from the bus for the remainder of the school year, and the students had to attend a
seminar on sexual harassment. One week after the students were punished (and despite the
bus suspension), one of the students was allowed to ride the bus because the father
complained to the principal that it was a hardship to drive him back and forth. Once Jesse
and his parents found out about the reverse in discipline, Jesse stopped riding the bus
completely without notifying the school of the reason. Shortly thereafter, the Montgomerys
filed suit with the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging that ISD had
violated Jesse’s rights under Title IX.
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First the court turned to the school district’s arguments that the harassment Jesse
experienced was not sufficiently severe and pervasive, it did not result in a denial of
education opportunities, there was insufficient evidence of deliberate indifference, and the
school lacked sufficient notice of the harassment to be found liable under Title IX.
With regard to whether the harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive, the court held that the “explicitly sexual acts” perpetrated by other students
constituted “more than ordinary juvenile bullying and was sufficiently severe and
extraordinarily frequent and pervasive.”555
Regarding the district’s argument that the harassment that Jesse experienced did not
deny him of any educational opportunities or benefits, the court held that the activities that
he was excluded from due to his fear was an exclusion of his benefits. He was afraid to use
the bathroom and the lunchroom, ride the bus, and participate in intramurals, and most
importantly, he transferred to another district.556
In discussing the school district’s argument that Jesse had presented insufficient
evidence of deliberate indifference, the court noted that he complained several times to no
avail.557 The only example of a response was when the district suspended several students
in response to Jesse’s formal complaints. The court viewed the action to be too little in
light of the harassment he endured over 10 years and was ample evidence of deliberate
indifference on the part of the school district.558
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Finally, in response to the school district’s contention that the school lacked
sufficient notice of the harassment to be found liable under Title IX, the court stated simply
that the district’s “actual knowledge of the harassment cannot be seriously disputed. . . .
Jesse had made hundreds of complaints about the harassment to school teachers, cafeteria
and playground monitors, bus drivers, principals, assistant principals, locker room
attendants, counselors, and even the superintendent.”559 The court found that the district
did have actual knowledge and ultimately denied the district’s motion for summary
judgment.

Ray v. Antioch Unified School District560
The case of Ray v. Antioch Unified School District561 tested the boundaries of a
school district’s liability for a Title IX violation under gender nonconformity harassment.
Daniel Ray was an eighth-grade student at Antioch Middle School. Daniel’s mother was a
transgender female in the process of gender transformation. Daniel alleged that between
January and February 1999, one of his classmates, Jonathon Carr, and other students
repeatedly threatened and verbally abused him during the school day and school
activities.562 Daniel claimed that the harassment took place because the other students
thought he was a homosexual. The students came to this conclusion because Daniel’s
mother was a transgender female. Daniel also alleged that the teachers and administrators
at Antioch were aware of the harassment and that everyone believed he was a homosexual.
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In fact, Daniel claims that he reported the harassment by Jonathan and the other students to
the Antioch administrators, who were responsible for the safety of the students.563 He even
asked for protection from the harassment when attending school and school activities.
According to Daniel, the administration and staff at Antioch took no action to prevent the
harassing conduct. Daniel also alleged that the school should have known that Jonathan
was a danger because of his violent history and his attacks on others.564
On February 23, 1999, Jonathon assaulted and battered Daniel on his way home
from school. Jonathan allegedly struck Daniel in the head, causing a concussion, hearing
impairment in one ear, severe and permanent headaches, and severe psychological injury.565
Daniel believed that this attack and the harassment that he endured was a direct result of
Antioch Unified School District’s indifference to his physical safety and well-being. He
also claimed that their indifference created an environment of harassment so severe and
pervasive that Daniel’s access to an education opportunity was affected.566
The Ray family filed a lawsuit with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California against Antioch Unified School District under Title IX for sex discrimination.
The Ray family claimed that the school district showed deliberate indifference to their son’s
complaints of severe sexual perception-based harassment. The district court first had to
determine whether the Rays could proceed with a Title IX claim. After reviewing the facts
of the case, the court ruled:
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[A]lthough Ray’s complaint makes no specific characterization of the
harassing conduct as “sexual” in nature, it is reasonable to infer that the basis
of the attacks was a perceived belief about Ray’s sexuality, i.e., that Ray was
harassed on the basis of sex. The court found no material difference between
the instance in which a female student is subject to unwelcome sexual
comments and advances due to her harasser’s perception that she is a sexual
object and the instance in which a male student is insulted and abused due to
his harasser’s perception of the victim’s sexuality and is not distinguishable
to this court.567
Once the district court decided that the school district could be held liable for Title
IX sex discrimination, the court then applied the Title IX three-prong test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Davis. In applying Davis, the court first turned to the issue of whether
the school had responded with deliberate indifference to Daniel’s report. Taking Daniel’s
allegations as true, the court ruled that he stated a claim. The court referred to the
allegations that Daniel had informed his teachers and school officials of the harassment,
threats, and intimidation and these employees acted with deliberate indifference to these
known acts.568 The employees of the school had taken no apparent action to curtail the
harassing conduct, even though they knew that Carr presented a specific threat to Daniel’s
safety.569
The court next examined whether the school had actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment. Because Daniel informed his teachers and school officials of the harassment,
the court had no problem holding that Daniel had met this burden on the face of the
complaint.570
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With regard to whether the sexual harassment was severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive, the court concluded that such harassment had occurred. Accepting
all of the allegations by Daniel as true, the court could infer that the harassing conduct was
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive.571
Finally, the court turned to the issue of whether the harassment had deprived access
to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school. Again, accepting the
allegations as true that Daniel was afraid for his safety and well-being, it could be
concluded that he was denied access to his educational opportunities and benefits.572

Snelling v. Fall Mountain Regional School District573
Another case regarding sexual orientation and perceived sexual orientation
harassment and bullying took place also in 2001. The case was Snelling v. Fall Mountain
Regional School District.574 Derek Snelling began his freshman year at Fall Mountain
Regional High School in 1994. Before trying out for the basketball team, Derek had heard
a rumor that the coaches preferred to play students from Walpole and not from
Charlestown, which was Derek’s hometown. Derek made the team, but he soon realized
that the students from Walpole made friends with each other exclusively and admittedly did
not like Derek for reasons he did not know.
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The first incident of harassment occurred on November 16, 1994. After practice
that day, Derek was the only person who took a shower. The next day, the players from
Walpole approached Derek at school and said, “How are you, Stiffy? I saw you in the
showers last night with another guy, and you had a stiffy.”575 From this point forward,
Derek was called “Stiffy” by his teammates, and they even began to call him “fag,” “Jew
boy,” and “homo.”576 Derek was even confronted by team members asking him why he
was dating a girl and suggested he was just trying to cover up his sexual preference.
According to Derek, it was more than just the students harassing him; he also
claimed that the coaches treated him unfairly. In one incident at an away game, as Derek
came off the court and passed the coach, the coach grabbed him by the shirt, swung him
around, and shouted at him never to run by again. The coaches also allowed teammates to
be unnecessarily rough with Derek during practices.577
Joel Snelling, Derek’s younger brother, entered Fall Mountain Regional High
School in the fall of 1995. By this time, it was more than the basketball players harassing
Derek. The whole school had caught on and was also verbally harassing Derek. Joel did
not experience much harassment at first, but eventually the other students began to call him
“Little Stiffy” and “fag boy.”578 Joel joined the basketball team as well, and he began to
experience the same unfair treatment from the coaches as his brother had. One instance of
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this treatment was when Derek and Joel brought weight vests to wear during practice to
improve their jumping ability. One of the coaches made a comment that Derek could take
his “bra” off faster than Joel could, referring to the weight vest.579 Derek had informed the
principal in the past about the harassment, but no action had been taken. After this incident,
he decided to speak to the assistant principal. The assistant principal had Derek file a
sexual harassment complaint against the coach. During an investigation, the coach denied
making the “bra” comments, and several players backed up the coach’s story. After the
investigation, the assistant principal informed Derek that no action could be taken against
the coach because they could not prove Derek’s claims.580
The verbal abuse escalated after Derek made the sexual harassment complaint
against the coach. Eventually, Mr. and Mrs. Snelling met with the superintendent of the
school district in March 1997. After the meeting, the school district lawyer drafted a letter
for the Snellings, outlining the course of action the district planned to take based upon their
complaints. In this letter, the Snellings were told that the basketball coaches would not be
rehired next year and that the assistant principal, principal, and athletic director had been
informed of the district’s sexual harassment policy and that they were responsible for the
safety and proper treatment of the children.581
The harassment still continued even after the meeting with the superintendent and
school lawyer. The boys were still harassed at school, basketball practice, and basketball
games. Due to the persistent and pervasive harassment, the boys claimed that their grades
579
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suffered and that they had experienced emotional and physical distress. The Snellings
decided to file suit against the Fall Mountain Regional School District with the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Hampshire, alleging a violation of Title IX.
In the court’s analysis, the court determined that the harassment was widespread and
that some of the harassment came from coaches; however, a trial-worthy issue remained as
to whether the harassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to
be actionable under Title IX.582
Moving to the questions of actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, the court
recognized that the Supreme Court left no clear indication of which school officials must
receive notice on behalf of the funding recipient to constitute actual notice.583 The court
decided to follow the persuasive authority of other jurisdictions and held that “if an official
has authority to take corrective action and is sufficiently high in the school’s command
chain, his official actions constitute an official action by the funding recipient.”584 Because
the district did not claim that those who received notice of the alleged harassment lacked
authority to act on its behalf, the court found that the question of notice also remained a
trial-worthy issue.
Next, the court determined whether the districts response to the harassment was
clearly unreasonable. The district asserted that the Snellings’ meeting with the
superintendent in March 1997 constituted its initial notice of the harassment, and the court
accepted the Snellings’ reliance on the notice given to the school principal in the spring of
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1996. Because nothing was done when the principal received the report of harassment, the
court concluded that the district’s lack of response demonstrated deliberate indifference to
the harassment Derek experienced.585 The court determined that a trial-worthy issue also
remained regarding deliberate indifference.
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CHAPTER 3
DESCRIPTIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS

In order to provide school district leaders with a relevant legal history of student-onstudent sexual harassment, a descriptive legal analysis was employed for this study.
Research included an extensive search for relevant sources of law, including federal
regulations, case law, related law review articles, scholarly publications, and other
documents. Legal opinions of student-on-student sexual harassment cases were also studied
and considered. Using deductive analysis and triangulation, these sources were reviewed,
analyzed, and synthesized to construct a historical perspective on the development of
school district liability for student-on-student sexual harassment. The most up-to-date legal
issues were considered with the purpose of formulating a recommendation to school district
leaders. By employing an exhaustive examination of all relevant information, the
conclusions used to prepare these recommendations are designed to be fully informed and
topically definitive.
Utilizing these methods, it was discovered that since the Davis ruling the federal
circuit courts have reviewed multiple student-on-student sexual harassment cases. How the
federal circuits have defined and applied each of these standards has varied. The following
analysis brings forth the federal circuit courts’ application of the Davis test prongs and
some indication of how each of these circuits is interpreting when a school district can be
liable for a Title IX violation for student-on-student sexual harassment.

116
Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive and Deprivation
of Educational Opportunities/Benefits
The first prong of the Davis test requires student-on-student sexual harassment to be
“so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”586 In analyzing
the case law from Chapter 2, the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts defined a
threshold that makes sexual harassment into actionable harassment under Title IX.
The Seventh Circuit Court, in Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology,587 stated
that actionable conduct must be “severe and repeated . . . and must have a systemic effect
on the student.”588 The student in this case did not experience severe and repeated
harassment that had a systemic effect on her; therefore, it did not satisfy the first prong.
In Adusumilli, a Title IX suit was brought against the university by a student for
being subjected to sexual harassment on 12 separate occasions by four professors and six
students.589 Although the court described most of the incidents as “ogling” and “unwanted
touching,” there were two incidents in which the harassers touched her breast.590 Only 2 of
the 12 incidents were reported to school officials by the student.591 Because the student did
not report all the incidents, the Seventh Circuit Court declined to address whether or not the
nonreported incidents were severe.592 The incidents that were analyzed based on the Davis
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severity prong were the touching of her shoulder by one student and the touching of her
breast by another student.593
In the court’s analysis, it was found that the two reported incidents were each single
occurrences and they were not severe and did nor invaded the student’s educational
experience.594 Because there were no incidents that took place after the report, the effect of
the harassment stopped, and there was no action the school needed to take.595
Analyzing the Seventh Circuit Court’s interpretation of the Davis severity prong,
once a report of the harassment is made, there must be more than one occurrence of sexual
harassment, by the same person, for the harassment to be “severe and repeated” enough to
cause a “systemic effect.”596
The federal circuit courts that have found student-on-student sexual harassment to
be severe and pervasive enough to satisfy this prong of the Davis test are the Sixth and
Tenth Circuit Courts. In the Sixth Circuit Court case, Vance v. Spencer County Public
School District, a student, Alma McGowen, reported physical and verbal sexual harassment
over several years.597 It was alleged that she had been stabbed in the hand, on one occasion
had been held by several classmates as others tried to rip off her clothes, and had been
subjected to continuous verbal sexual comments.598 This all took place after a complaint
had been filed with the school’s Title IX coordinator.599 After the harassment was reported
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231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000).
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to the school official, no investigation took place.600 The only action taken was a
discussion with the perpetrators, which proved ineffective.601 In fact, the harassment
usually escalated after the discussions.602
In the Tenth Circuit Court’s case, Murrell v. School District No. 1, a
developmentally and physically disabled student, Penelope Jones, experienced extensive
sexual harassment over the course of a month, including sexual assault and battery.603 The
mother of the harassing student had warned the school of her son’s sexually aggressive
tendencies.604 After the teachers were warned of this behavior, they discovered that he was
engaging in sexually aggressive behavior toward Penelope. Even with the knowledge of
the harassing student behavior, the school allowed him to act as a janitor’s assistant, which
granted him access to unsupervised areas of the school.605 While acting as the janitor’s
assistant, he took Penelope to a secluded area in the school and sexually assaulted her.606
The harassment took a toll on Penelope, and she became self-destructive and suicidal and
entered a psychiatric hospital.607 After some time in the hospital, Penelope did return back
to school. It was only one day before she was battered by the same harassing student and
made fun of by the other students who knew about the earlier sexual attacks.608
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Id. at 256. The court seems to imply that the lack of reaction may have stemmed from one of the
perpetrators being a school board member's son.
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186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999) (construing the facts as true to review the lower court's granting of
a motion to dismiss).
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244.
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Similar to facts in Davis, those in Vance and Murrell had patterns of increasing
sexual harassment committed by the same person. The harassment that these students
endured ended in a serious concrete physical effect on the victims. The concrete effects
that the students endured are as follows: In Davis, Lashonda’s grades had dropped and she
had written a suicide note.609 In Vance, Alma had to complete her schoolwork at home after
being diagnosed with depression;610 and in Murrell, Penelope suffered self-destructive and
suicidal tendencies that eventually caused her to stay in a psychiatric hospital.611 In these
cases, neither the Sixth nor the Tenth Circuit Courts had difficulty identifying them as
severe.612
Several conclusions can be drawn from these cases. First, single incidents of minor
student misconduct, such as name-calling, ogling and unwanted touching, are unlikely to be
seen as having a systemic effect on its victim.613 These types of actions are also less likely
to be considered severe, pervasive and objectively offensive. Finally, if the harassing
student misconduct stops as soon as it happens and is not repeated, it is not likely to be
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526 U.S. 629, 634 (1999).
231 F.3d 253, 257 (6th Cir. 2000).
186 F.3d at 1244.
See 186 F.3d at 1244. The court analyzed whether the harassment inflicted upon Ms. Jones was
sufficiently “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” to satisfy Davis. Ms. Murrell had alleged that
over the course of about a month, Mr. Doe repeatedly took Ms. Jones to a secluded area and battered,
undressed, and sexually assaulted her. Although Mr. Doe’s behavior did not last as long as the
harassment in Davis, it is easily concluded that Ms. Murrell had alleged wrongdoing “sufficiently severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive” to state a claim. See 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000). The court
determined that Alma submitted abundant evidence of both verbal and physical sexual harassment.
Although one incident can satisfy a claim, Alma presented several instances that reflect not only severity
and pervasiveness but also circumstances that effectively denied her education.
Adusumilli, 1999 WL 528169; Sanchez v. Carrollton-Farmers Branch School District, 647 F.3d 156
(2011).
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considered the type of pervasive and offensive harassment that is actionable under Title
IX.614
On the other hand, if a student is battered, undressed, and/or sexually assaulted, a
court is likely to find that he/she has been subject to severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive harassment.615 If a student is constantly subjected to threats, insults, taunts, and
abuse during the school day and during activities, especially if such harassment ends in an
assault and battery, a court is likely to find the harassment as severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive.616 There is no clear line that exists between harassment and merely
unpleasant conduct.617 Absent extreme severity or egregiousness, simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated comments are not likely to give rise to an actionable claim for Title
IX harassment.618
Davis also requires that the victim demonstrate that the sexual harassment they
experienced denied him or her access to educational opportunity. The cases analyzed
revealed that the victim is not required to show physical exclusion to demonstrate that
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See Murrell, 186 F. 3d at 1248; see also Soper, 195 F.3d at 855d 67. (The court assumed that one
incident of rape subjected the minor to severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment.)
Ray, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1171; see also Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1244 (stating that the student left school,
engaged in self-destructive and suicidal behavior, and entered a psychiatric hospital; see Snelling v. Fall
Mountain Regional School District, 2001 DNH 57. (Evidence showed they suffered widespread peer
harassment; a jury could reasonably conclude that it went far beyond mere teasing and was sufficiently
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to be actionable under Title IX.) See also Montgomery v.
Independent School District No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (in which sexual favors and verbal conduct of
a sexual nature were aimed at the victim).
Anne-Marie Harris and Kenneth B. Grooms, A New Lesson Plan for Educational Institutions: Expanded
Rules Governing Liability Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 for Student and Faculty
Sexual Harassment, 9 Am. U.L. Gender, Soc. Pol’y & L., 575, supra note 839 at 1325 (2000).
See Gabrielle v. Park Forest, 315 F. 3d 1279. (Most of the conduct the girl complained about was so
vague that it did not provide a basis to determine whether that conduct was severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive harassment.). See Rost v. Steamboat Springs, 511 F.3d 1114 (the complaints by the
student that the boys were “bothering” her do not meet the level of sexual harassment).
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he/she has been deprived of those opportunities.619 This requirement confirms
congressional intent that Congress stated explicitly that no one shall be subjected to
discrimination in a federally funded educational program.620 It also finds support in the fact
that Congress, in enacting Title IX, made no reference to a requirement that sexual
harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, is actionable only when it results in a lack of
participation in, or a denial of, benefits of a federally funded program. In light of this
finding, courts still require that a victim show that sexual harassment has, at a minimum,
undermined and detracted from his or her educational experience to the extent that the
victim is effectively denied equal access to educational opportunities.621
If a student becomes a danger to him/herself, must be hospitalized, is suspended for
reporting harassment, is raped and/or sexually abused and harassed, or is placed into a
home-schooling environment because of the sexual harassment, a court is likely to find that
the student has been deprived of an educational opportunity.622 When the harassment
renders its victim afraid to take advantage of even the most basic of educational
opportunities, a deprivation is most likely to be found. For example, if a student claims that
the harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that he/she is afraid to use
the bathroom, avoids eating in the cafeteria, avoids the school bus, and does not participate
in extracurricular activities, a court is likely to find that he/she has been deprived access to
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Ray, 107 F.Supp.2d at 1171; see, e.g. Bodensteiner, supra note 1 at 38-39.
See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681; see also Safier, supra note 839, at 1326.
Ray, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1171.
See, e.g., Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248-49 (reporting harassment); Soper, 195 F.3d at 855 (discussing rape
and sexual abuse and harassment); Vance, 231 F. 3d at 259 (involving a victim of harassment that
resulted in her being home schooled).
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educational opportunities protected by Title IX.623 Being diagnosed with depression may
also demonstrate the deprivation of an educational opportunity, as demonstrated in Vance.

Actual Notice
For a school district to be found liable for a Title IX student-on-student sexual
harassment claim, there must be actual notice to an official with the power to address the
complaint. The primary question raised by Davis is exactly who in a school’s hierarchy
must have actual knowledge of the sexual harassment before a school district itself can be
said to have actual knowledge of the harassment.
The Sixth and Tenth Circuit Courts have decided cases in which there was clear and
ample actual notice to a high-ranking school administrator.624 The Eighth and Ninth Circuit
Courts have ruled on cases of what constitutes actual notice when it was not clear in the
facts.625
The Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts decided to analyze whether or not the school
district exercised substantial control over both the harasser and where the harassment
occurred as another factor simultaneously analyzed with the actual-notice prong.626 This is
unique because most of the other circuits have not taken this factor into consideration for
the actual-notice prong in the Davis test.627 However, for the majority of the court in Davis,
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Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. Jesse Montgomery, the victim in this case, eventually transferred
to an entirely different school district. This contributed to the court’s decision that Jesse’s harassment
had deprived him of an educational opportunity.
186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999); 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000).
265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001); 208 F.3d 736, 740-41 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id.
See F.3d 1006; 94 F. Supp. 2d 447; 315 F.3d 817; 322 F.3d 1279; 488 F.3d 67; 504 F.3d 165; 647 F.3d
156.
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“deliberate indifference makes sense as a theory of direct liability under Title IX only
where the funding recipient has some control over the alleged harassment. A recipient
cannot be directly liable for its indifference where it lacks the authority to take remedial
action.”628
The Ninth Circuit Court defined the actual-notice requirement narrowly. In the
Ninth Circuit, direct reporting to an official with the authority to correct the situation has to
take place. In the other circuits, the courts have grappled with the question of whether or
not notice to a teacher, who, in many instances, has some control to address the behavior or
can report it to an administrator, is enough to satisfy the actual-notice requirement. The
Ninth Circuit’s approach is stricter, and it has determined that actual notice is an essential
standard. The Ninth Circuit Court, in Reese v. Jefferson School District No. 14J, addressed
the students who brought suit against the district but had not given actual notice to school
officials who had the power to remedy the harassment.629 When the students brought suit,
they had already graduated from school, yet they still wanted to hold the school liable for
harassment experienced by a group of male peers.630 The Ninth Circuit Court held that,
even though there was some evidence that a teacher observed the harassment, it was not
sufficient to establish that actual notice had been given to an official with the power to
correct the harassment.631
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The Eighth Circuit Court took an even narrower view of the Davis actual-notice
prong in its analysis in P.H. v. School District of Kansas City.632 In this case, the student
sued the school district for a sexual relationship she had with a teacher over the course of
two years. The Eighth Circuit Court defined actual notice as follows: “A school district
must have had actual notice of a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student, and the school
district must have made an official decision not to remedy the violation in order for liability
to attach to the school district.”633 P.H. argued that the actual-notice standard had not yet
been clearly defined and tried to make the case that in some instances teachers have the
necessary control to address the harassment. The Eighth Circuit Court held that
constructive notice was not acceptable under Davis; they held that notice must be actually
given to a school official.634
Based on the post-Davis cases, one can assume that the courts do not identify exact
job titles within a school district when attempting to make this determination.635 As one
court noted, “School districts contain a number of layers below the school board:
superintendents, principals, vice principals, and teachers and coaches, not to mention
specialized counselors such as Title IX coordinators. Different school districts may assign
different duties to these positions or even reject the traditional hierarchical structure
altogether.”636
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265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 663.
See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247.
Id. (citing Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660).
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However, a court is likely to find actual knowledge on the part of a school district
when a school official who possesses the requisite control over a situation involving sexual
harassment has actual knowledge of the harassment.637 When the highest ranking
administrator, who has substantial control over students and the school environment during
school hours, has actual knowledge of allegations of sexual harassment, a court imputes
his/her knowledge to the school board.638
In a majority of the cases analyzed in which a student complains about peer sexual
harassment that occurs during school hours and on school grounds, teachers possess the
requisite control to take corrective action to end the discrimination.639 In these
circumstances, teachers ordinarily maintain a sufficient level of disciplinary control over
their students during school hours.640 When a student victim or parents inform teachers and
school administrators of harassment based on sex, a court may find that actual knowledge
did exist.641 Actual notice can come in the form of a note or can be done verbally. It can
also come in the form of a formal Title IX complaint.642
One scholar noted, “Many students and parents will not always report the incident to
the most powerful official at the school, but instead are more likely to report harassment to
someone at the school with whom they feel comfortable, or who has direct control over the
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Montgomery, 109 F. Supp.2d at 1099; see also Snelling, 2001 WL 276975, *5; see also Kathleen A.
Sullivan and Perry A. Zirkel, Student to Student Sexual Harassment: Which Tack Will the Supreme Court
Take in a See of Analysis?, 132 West Educ. L. Rep., 609, 611 (1999).
See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,277 (1998).
See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248; see also Manfredi, 94 F. Supp.2d at 453.
Montgomery, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1099.
Ray, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1169; Montgomery, 109 F. Supp.2d at 1099; Vance, 231 F.3d at 259.
See, e.g., Vance, 231 F.3d at 529 (finding actual knowledge in cases in which a victim had verbally
informed school officials of harassment and her mother had done so in writing).
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classroom.”643 If a school district believes that the individual alleged to have actual
knowledge of the harassment lacks the authority to take corrective action or to act on behalf
of the school board, the school board should document this position. One district court has
determined that failure to do so would create a trial-worthy issue that allows a case to
survive pretrial motions to dismiss.644
Some scholars even contend that the actual-notice standard provides schools with
little incentive to develop antiharassment policies and procedures and may work against
those students who do report harassment.645 Some even argue that the Supreme Court’s
reliance on the actual-notice standard does not make sense.646 At best, the Davis decision
expects schools only to react to claims of student-on-student sexual harassment rather than
to take preventive steps to keep them from happening. At worst, the actual-notice standard
invites school districts to purposefully remain ignorant of sexual harassment in their
schools.647
Those who oppose the actual-notice standard argue that students look to teachers not
only for guidance but for protection from harm by other students.648 Adults have the ability
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to leave the workplace to avoid sexual harassment, but students have little opportunity to
leave their school.649 The harm caused by the student-on-student sexual harassment usually
has a greater and longer-lasting impact on child victims. It can also institutionalize sexual
harassment as normal behavior.650 By approving what some believe is an unfair standard,
many argue that the Supreme Court has hindered active Title IX enforcement and has
offered immunity to all school districts that claim that no one with remedial authority had
knowledge of the harassment.651
Those in opposition to the actual-notice standard believe that it is unreasonable to
place the burden of reporting sexual harassment on the student when society recognizes that
children are not prepared to make such decisions.652 The Supreme Court’s requirement that
a victim of sexual harassment report the incident to a person who is in a position of
authority over the harasser presents problems for the victim because he/she may have
difficulty determining to whom the report should be made.653 For example, a third-grade
victim experiencing peer sexual harassment on the playground each day may believe that
the appropriate person to inform is the playground supervisor, whom she thinks has the
authority to remove the student from the playground, but it is not clear that the supervisor is
“an official of the recipient entity with authority to take corrective action to end the
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discrimination.”654 Consequently, it is unlikely that a victim in this situation could prevail
under Title IX because the school district is likely to be viewed as having no knowledge of
the harassment because the playground supervisor is not the proper authority.
Other scholars support the actual-notice standard. These supporters have argued
that the actual-knowledge standard is appropriate because school districts cannot be
expected to adequately respond to allegations of sexual harassment unless a high-level
school official has received notice of the harassment.655 This is especially true of studenton-student, as opposed to teacher-on-student, sexual harassment because children are more
prone to inappropriate behavior than adults.

Deliberate Indifference
The Davis-defined deliberate-indifference standard has been challenging for the
courts to define. However, Davis defines it as acting “clearly unreasonably.”656 In two
cases in which the students prevailed, the courts interpreted the phrase “deliberate
indifference” as a two-step inquiry into (1) whether a school took any steps to address the
complaint of sexual harassment and, if so, (2) whether the steps taken were not clearly
unreasonable steps to address the complaint of sexual harassment.657
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Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (requiring that someone with authority
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Using this two-step inquiry, the Sixth Circuit Court granted summary judgment to
the school district because the court looked to see only if the school took any remedial
steps. The effectiveness or timing of the remedial steps was not taken into consideration.658
The Sixth Circuit Court, in Soper v. Hoben, a case in which a special-education student was
raped at school and on the bus by three of her peers, ruled in favor of the school district
because remedial steps were taken when they received notice.659 The majority’s opinion in
in the Soper stated:
Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence of deliberate indifference
attributable to defendants. Once they did learn of the incidents, they quickly
and effectively corrected the situation. Defendants immediately contacted
the proper authorities, investigated the incidents themselves, installed
windows in the doors of the special-education classroom, placed an aide in
Harmala’s classroom, and created student counseling sessions concerning
how to function socially with the opposite sex.660
Another way a school can be found deliberately indifferent for sexual harassment is
if they do not respond to the harassment because they fail to recognize that the harassment
is based on sex. Although Title IX does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
perceived orientation, in some cases harassment based on gender identity or orientation
(even perceived orientation) may occur “because of” sex and, therefore, be sexual
harassment prohibited by Title IX. According to a number of federal district courts,
harassment of students may constitute the type of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX
if it arises out of sex-based stereotyping or out of the student’s failure to conform to
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195 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 1999).
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stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity.661 In 2000, in Ray v. Antioch Unified
School District, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California became one
of the first to recognize that gender nonconformity harassment may be actionable under
Title IX.662 Just one month later, in Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota did the same.663 There, a student
brought an action based on Title IX, claiming that a variety of school district officials,
including teachers, bus drivers, principals, assistant principals, playground and cafeteria
monitors, locker-room attendants, school counselors, and even the school district
superintendent inadequately and inconsistently responded to the bullying he suffered over
many years due to his perceived sexual orientation.664 The inadequate and inconsistent
response equated to deliberate indifference. In both cases, the defendants sought summary
judgment on the grounds that any Title IX claims should be dismissed because Title IX did
not protect individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation or perceived sexual
orientation. In both cases, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were denied.
The lessons and conclusions from these cases are as follows: when a school
administrator receives a complaint concerning student-on-student sexual harassment, an
investigation into the allegations must be done immediately. The term “deliberate
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indifference” describes an official decision by the school not to remedy the alleged sexual
harassment.665 This can be somewhat misleading because school administrators do not
need to eradicate the sexual harassment from their school to be free from liability under
Title IX.666 As stated earlier, they must respond to known peer harassment in a manner that
is not clearly unreasonable.
When a person with sufficient authority completely refuses to investigate known
claims of sexual harassment, a court may find that the school responded with deliberate
indifference.667 Responding to a formal complaint of harassment by suspending the
offending students but failing to respond to several previous complaints of harassment by
the same student might be considered tantamount to not responding at all.668 The
implication is that a school’s response to claims of harassment must be considered in light
of the number of complaints not addressed.669
The best example for school administrators to study is found in a previously
mentioned case, Soper v. Hoben.670 In response to allegations of rape and sexual abuse, the
school quickly and effectively corrected the situation.671 The school contacted the
authorities, investigated the allegations themselves, installed windows in the doors of the
rooms, placed an aide in each classroom, and provided counseling to the offending
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student.672 When the rape and sexual harassment and abuse had been confirmed, the school
expelled the offending student.673
Soper exemplifies the type of response Title IX intends in appropriate situations.
However, such an extensive response is not always required. The standard neither requires
school administrators to expel every student accused of misconduct nor allows victims to
choose the remedy.674
Although it is not required by Davis, a proactive approach to preventing sexual
harassment by creating a policy of grievance procedure would offer children the protection
they deserve and potentially protect school districts from liability.675 If a student utilizes
the grievance procedure, and the school responds reasonably and timely to the allegations
of sexual harassment, the school and district are likely to escape liability under Title IX.676
When the school knows that its responses to the harassment are inadequate, Title IX does
require the school to take further reasonable action in light of the circumstances to avoid
liability.677
The deliberate-indifference standard works hand-in-hand with the actual-notice
standard. Requiring a school district to have actual notice of instances of sexual harassment
is undoubtedly likely to have the effect of forcing students to complain repeatedly about
sexual harassment, even when faced with inaction on the part of the school district.678 The
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deliberate-indifference standard mandates concrete action against sexual harassment in
every case.679 The standard is not likely to tolerate a school’s use of the same ineffective
methods to no acknowledged avail.680
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See, e.g., Montgomery, 109 F. Supp.2d at 1095; Phassen v. Merrill Community School District, 668 F.3d
356 (2012).
Vance, 231 F. 3d at 262.

CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

One of the goals of this research study was to determine how the federal courts have
interpreted the Davis decision regarding school district liability for student-on-student
sexual harassment. Since Davis, a number of federal cases decided have addressed the
ramifications of its decision. Taken together, these cases give some direction on how the
courts may determine school administrator’s liability for student-on-student sexual
harassment.
A school district can be found liable for student-on-student sexual harassment under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 if the school district has actual knowledge
of the harassment and responds with deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment that is
determined to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively denies its
victim of an educational opportunity. Since the Supreme Court decision in Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., many lower court decisions have teased out the circumstances
that would trigger liability based upon the three-prong test in Davis.
The case law decided after Davis demonstrates that actual knowledge is likely to be
assigned to a school district when an individual with authority to take corrective action has
been notified of the sexual harassment. In most cases analyzed, this individual is the
principal.
Post-Davis cases have also decided that once the individual has this notice, he/she is
obligated to respond in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable in light of the known
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circumstances. A reasonable response from that individual with the authority to take
corrective action can range from a lecture to contacting the police. It is also important for
school administrators to recognize whether their intervention to the harassment has proven
ineffective. If the harassment is ineffective, the school is obligated to utilize another
method to avoid new liability.
Regarding the requirement that the harassment be severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive, cases after Davis confirm that simple teasing does not usually rise to this level.
Neither are one-time occurrences likely to rise to the level of actionable harassment, unless
that one-time occurrence results in mental or physical abuse or hospitalization. These types
of incidents are likely to constitute “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive”
harassment.
The cases analyzed also inform school administrators that it is not necessary to
show physical exclusion to demonstrate that a student has been denied an educational
opportunity. In the cases analyzed, being deprived an educational opportunity means more
than missing a day or two of school. This is also the case with the severity requirement;
simple acts of teasing or bothering are not be considered sexual harassment that denies a
student access to educational opportunities. For a student to prevail, he/she must show that
sexual harassment has at least undermined and detracted from his/her educational
experience to the extent that he/she has been effectively denied equal access to educational
opportunities.
Some scholars contend that the Davis standard affords little protection to the victims
of student-on-student sexual harassment and does not enact Title IX’s purposes. Some
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argue that the Supreme Court seems to be more concerned with the financial health of
recipients of federal funds than compensating victims under a law designed to end sex
discrimination in education. Others argue, “The Court, while noble in its intentions, has
misplaced responsibility, which should lie with the person who is doing the harassing and
not the school.”681 Most importantly, the standards in Davis do nothing to address how
schools can (and should try to) eliminate sexual harassment in the first place. This is
important for the school district not only to avoid liability but, more importantly, to ensure
that all students receive an equal education.
It was also the goal of this research study to analyze federal court cases and
recommend to school administrators what they can do to prevent and address student-onstudent sexual harassment. In light of the case law reviewed and analyzed, it is this
researcher’s recommendation that all school districts utilize the following guidelines to
avoid liability for student-on student harassment. All districts should:
1. Understand the requirements under Title IX related to sexual harassment.
2. Implement procedural requirements pertaining to sexual harassment.
3. Institute steps to prevent sexual harassment.682

681

682

Justin Wieland, Peer-on-Peer Hate Crime and Hate-Motivated Incidents Involving Children in
California’s Public Schools: Contemporary Issues in Prevalence, Response and Prevention, 11 UC Davis
J. Juv. L. & Pol’y, Summer 2007, at 235, 259.
U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties 19 (2001).

137
Understanding Requirements under Title IX
Related to Sexual Harassment
Title IX protects students from sexual harassment in a school’s education programs
and activities.683 This includes the academic, educational, extracurricular, athletic, and
other programs of the school.684 These programs can take place in a school’s facilities, on a
school bus, at an activity sponsored by the school at another location, or elsewhere.685
If a school knows or reasonably should know about student-on-student sexual
harassment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to eliminate the
harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effect on the victim.686 Schools also are
required, as recipients of Title IX federal funds, to publish a notice of nondiscrimination
and to adopt and publish grievance procedures.687 School districts should also provide
training that teaches all employees to whom they should report harassment and employees
with the authority to address harassment how to respond properly.688 It is recommended by
the OCR that training for employees include practical information on how to identify and
report sexual harassment.689
School officials need to recognize that they might have an obligation to respond to
student-on-student sexual harassment that initially occurs off school grounds and not during
an education program or activity.690 In fact, it is irrelevant where the conduct occurred if
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the student files a complaint with the school.691 Once the school receives the complaint, it
must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures.692 It will also be
important for the school to ensure that the student who was assaulted off campus is
protected from further sexual harassment or retaliation from the perpetrator and his or her
peers.693
School administrators need to be aware that a complaint can be filed under the
school’s grievance procedure by harassed students or on their behalf by parents or a third
party. This complaint would trigger the school to investigate promptly the incident and
then take appropriate steps to resolve the situation.694 When criminal conduct is involved,
school personnel must determine whether appropriate law enforcement or other authorities
should be notified.695
Due to the nature of the complaint, school administrators should contact parents of
students under 18 for consent before beginning an investigation.696 However, if the
complainant requests that the victim remain confidential, the school should take all
reasonable steps to investigate and respond to the complaint, trying to comply with the
request for confidentiality.697 If the person who made the complaint insists that his/her
identity remain confidential and not disclosed to the alleged perpetrator, the school should
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inform the perpetrator that his/her ability to respond may be limited.698 This would also be
a good time to inform the perpetrator that Title IX prohibits retaliation and that school
officials will not only take steps to prevent retaliation but also take strong responsive action
if it occurs.699
Compliance with Title IX, such as publishing a notice of nondiscrimination,
designating an employee to coordinate Title IX compliance, and adopting and publishing
grievance procedures, can serve as preventive measures against harassment.700 These
policy actions, combined with education and training programs, can help ensure that all
students and employees recognize the nature of sexual harassment.701

Implementation of Procedural Requirements
Pertaining to Sexual Harassment
Any school that receives federal financial assistance must comply with the
procedural requirements outlined in the Title IX. Specifically, a recipient must:


Disseminate a notice of nondiscrimination;



Designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and

carry out its responsibilities under Title IX; and


Adopt and publish grievance procedures that provide for prompt and

equitable resolution of student and employee sex discrimination complaints.702
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These requirements apply to all forms of sexual harassment and are important for
preventing and effectively responding to sex discrimination.703 The OCR advises schools
to review their current policies and procedures on sexual harassment to make sure those
policies comply with the requirements.704 If deficiencies are found, it is the responsibility
of the school district to implement the changes as needed.

Notice of Nondiscrimination
Title IX regulations make it mandatory that school districts each publish a notice of
nondiscrimination.705 In this notice, it must be stated that the school does not discriminate
on the basis of sex in its education programs and activities.706 The notice must state that
questions regarding Title IX should be directed to the school’s Title IX coordinator or to
OCR. The Title IX coordinator’s contact information should also be included in the notice.
The notice must be widely distributed to all constituents. The OCR recommends that the
notice be posted on school websites and at multiple locations throughout the school.707 The
notice should be available and easily accessible on an ongoing basis.708
Title IX does not require school districts to adopt a policy specifically prohibiting
sexual harassment or sexual violence.709 However, it is important for school districts to
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know that a general policy prohibiting sex discrimination is not considered effective if
students are unaware of what kind of behavior constitutes sexual harassment and that such
behavior is prohibited.710 To address this, the OCR recommends that the school district’s
nondiscrimination policy state that prohibited sex discrimination covers sexual harassment,
including sexual violence, and that the policy include examples of the types of conduct that
it covers.711

Title IX Coordinator
Under Title IX, school districts are required to notify all students and employees of
the name and contact information of each person designated to coordinate the district’s
compliance with Title IX.712 The coordinator’s responsibilities should include overseeing
Title IX complaints and identifying and addressing any patterns or systemic problems that
arise during the review of such complaints.713 Once a coordinator is named, the school
district’s duty is to make sure that the coordinator has adequate training on what constitutes
sexual harassment and that he/she understands how the recipient’s grievance procedures
operate.714
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Grievance Procedures
Title IX regulations also require school districts to create and publish grievance
procedures.715 The grievance procedures must apply to sex discrimination complaints filed
by students against school employees, other students, or third parties.716
Grievance procedures can include informal mechanisms (e.g., mediation) for
resolving some types of sexual harassment complaints.717 However, the OCR has warned
school districts that it is not acceptable for a student who complains of harassment to be
required to work out the problem directly with the harasser without appropriate
involvement by the school (e.g., participation by a trained counselor, a trained mediator, or,
if appropriate, a teacher or administrator).718 School districts must also notify complainants
that they have the right to end the informal process at any time and begin the formal stage
of the complaint process.

Steps to Prevent Sexual Harassment
It is recommended that all schools implement preventive education programs and
make victim resources, including comprehensive victim services, available.719 Schools
might want to consider putting these education programs in their (a) orientation programs
for new students, faculty, staff, and employees; (b) training for students who serve as
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advisors in residence halls; (c) training for student athletes and coaches; and (d) school
assemblies and back-to-school nights.720 No matter what program a school chooses, it is
important for there to be a discussion of what constitutes sexual harassment and sexual
violence, the school’s policies and disciplinary procedures, and the consequences of
violating these policies.721
The education program that a school district uses should include information
encouraging students to report incidents of sexual violence to the appropriate school
official.722 Schools should be aware that victims or third parties may be afraid to report an
incident if they themselves have violated a school rule, such as using alcohol or drugs.723
For this reason, schools should consider whether their disciplinary policies are a deterrent
for victims or other students to report of sexual violence offenses.724 The OCR
recommends that schools let students know that their safety is first and foremost, that any
other rule violations will be addressed separately from the sexual violence allegation, and
that use of alcohol or drugs never makes the victim at fault for sexual violence.725
It is also recommended that schools develop specific sexual violence materials that
include the schools’ policies, rules, and resources for students, faculty, coaches, and
administrators.726 It is also a good idea for school districts to include this information in
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their employee handbook and any handbooks that student athletes and members of student
activity groups receive.727 The information in these materials should let students know
where and to whom they should go to if they are victims of sexual violence.728 These
materials also should tell students and school employees what to do if they learn of an
incident of sexual violence.729

Conclusion
Davis makes clear that peer sexual harassment is clearly sexual discrimination under
Title IX and is actionable for monetary damages if school officials are knowingly
indifferent to the harassment. The Supreme Court states that schools must not “clearly
unreasonably” respond to students’ allegations. However, if schools decide to discipline
only students who engage in this type of behavior, the problem of peer sexual harassment
will never be resolved. Schools must do more than just respond to allegations; they must
also attack the source of the problem. They must educate the entire school community
concerning sexual harassment in order to eliminate the myths, assumptions, biases,
stereotypes, and misconduct. Through proper education and effective policy, schools can
successfully curb cases of sexual harassment among students. This can allow them to
effectuate their goal of providing an equal education to all of their students.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
Agent: A person who is authorized to act for another (the agent’s principal) through
employment or by contract or apparent authority. The importance is that the agent can bind
the principal by contract or create liability if he/she causes injury while in the scope of the
agency. Who is an agent and what his/her authority is are often difficult and crucial factual
issues.
Allegation: An unsupported assertion made, especially in a legal proceeding, by a
party who expects to prove it.
Appeal: Timely resort by an unsuccessful party in a lawsuit or administrative
proceeding to an appropriate superior court empowered to review a final decision on the
grounds that it was based upon an erroneous application of law.
Appellant: The party who appeals to a higher court from the decision of a lower
tribunal.
Appellee: One against whom an appeal is taken.
Assault: An unlawful threat or attempt to do bodily injury to another; the act of
injuring or an instance of unlawfully threatening or attempting to injure another.
Battery: The unlawful and unwanted touching or striking of one person by another,
with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact.
Cause of action: A claim sufficient to demand judicial attention; the facts that give
rise to right of action.
Case law: The law as established by decisions of courts, especially appellate courts
in published opinions.
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Certiorari: A request that a higher court hear arguments that a lower court ruled
improperly on some or all issues in a lawsuit. The higher court does not have to honor the
request and therefore frequently “denies cert.” This is different from an appeal, which must
at least be heard by the higher court, even though the court may ultimately rule against the
person who filed the appeal.
Compensatory damages: Compensation for losses that can readily be proven to have
occurred and for which the injured party has the right to be compensated.
Complaint: A formal statement initiating a lawsuit by specifying the facts and legal
grounds for the relief sought; a formal charge, made under oath, of the commission of a
crime or other such offense.
Damages: Money required to be paid as compensation for an injury or wrong.
Deliberate indifference: Ignoring a situation known to exist.
Dissenting opinion: An opinion that disagrees with the court’s disposition of the
case.
En banc: By the full court.
Finding: A conclusion or decision upon a question of fact reached as a result of a
judicial examination or investigation by a court, jury, or referee.
Holding: A judge’s binding decree upon a particular issue of law in a case.
Jurisdiction: A range of authority or control, especially to interpret and apply the
law.
Liability: A party’s legal obligation, duty, or responsibility.
Litigation: A civil action of an adversary nature.
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Majority opinion: The opinion joined by a majority of the court (generally known
simply as “the opinion”).
Opinion: A court’s formal, usually written statement explaining its reasons for its
decision in a case; an attorney’s formal, usually written statement giving an assessment of
how the law should be or is likely to be applied in a particular situation; a piece of
testimony that is not usually admissible when given by a layperson, as in contrast to an
opinion given by an expert witness.
Petitioner: One who presents a petition to a court, officer, or legislative body; a
plaintiff.
Plaintiff: The party bringing suit in a court of law by the filing of the complaint.
Remand: The appellate court’s return of a case to a lower court for further
proceedings there.
Remedy: The means by which a right is enforced.
Right of action: The legal right to sue.
Sexual harassment: Inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature, such as repeated
sexual advances or offensive remarks, that occurs usually in a workplace, school, or other
institutional setting, especially by a person in authority with respect to a subordinate or a
student.
Suit or lawsuit: A proceeding in a court of law brought by one party against another,
especially a civil action.

